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ABSTRACT 
The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Program, initiated by 
DoD as a joint acquisition and warfighting community effort, is intended to exploit 
mature and maturing technologies to assist in solving identified military needs. The 
focus of the research is to examine the ACTD Program, its three classes and the 
contracting methods employed in each class. The objective of this research is to 
determine if contracting methodology is a critical decision element in the ACTD process 
and provide recommendations for Government contracting personnel in contracting for 
future ACTDs. This study compares and contrasts procurements through the formal 
acquisition process to those via the ACTD Program. Additionally, major ACTD 
outcomes, issues, challenges and lessons learned are analyzed to assess how they may 
impact the contracting process. Due to the highly diverse nature of ACTD systems, the 
choice or prescription of a particular contract method was not found to be a critical 
process element. The ACTD process should remain flexible to achieve the objectives for 
which it was established. Contracting officials should be encouraged to tailor the 
acquisition process to the needs of the particular programs, minimize cost, schedule and 
performance risks and incentivize contractor performance to the maximum extent 
possible. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the contracting methods employed by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) in the three defined classes of Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Programs and determine if contracting methodology 
is a critical decision element in the ACTD process. Each class of ACTD's unique 
characteristics, lessons learned, procedural and decision processes, and actual or 
predicted outcomes are considered and used to evaluate the contracting methods 
employed by DoD in. ACTD programs. The reasons for use and relative success or 
failure of these methods are assessed to determine if they are required or should be 
recommended for use in future programs. Additionally, this analysis is used to develop 
some general guidelines and recommendations for Government Contracting Officers. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program was· 
initiated by the DoD in early 1994 based on recommendations made by the Defense 
Science Board and Packard Commission. The concept allows the Government to receive 
an item or system and assess its performance in the field prior to an acquisition decision. 
As stated by the Packard Commission, the ACTD program seeks to "fly and know how 
much it costs before we buy". [Ref. 26:p. 1] 
The ACTD program permits an early and inexpensive evaluation of a mature 
advanced technology by the warfighter to determine its military utility. The goal of the 
program is to assess new military utilities under conditions on a scale sufficient to clearly 
establish operational functionality and system int~grity. The procurement process is 
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designed to be a joint effort between the warfighting (operational) and acquisition 
communities within DoD. 
The thrust of the ACTD program is to provide near-tenn responses to validated 
joint military needs. The responses to these military needs are usually technology-based 
and must be affordable, interoperable, sustainable, and capable of evolution. The 
demonstrated items or systems are retained by the warfighter for continued use and/or 
development to adapt to the changing technology or threat. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
1. Primary Research Question 
The technological nature and uncertain outcome of Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) present unique challenges for Government 
Contracting Officers but is the choice of a particular contracting method really critical to 
the ACTD process? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
(1) What is the traditional acquisition process and what are the relative 
benefits and disadvantages c~ently attributed to that process? 
(2) What is an ACTD? 
(3) How does the ACTD acquisition process differ from the traditional 
acquisition? 
(4) What are the principal issues involved in the transition of ACTDs and how 
are they being addressed? 
2 
(5) What, if any, general contracting method recommendations or guidelines 
for Government Contracting Officers can be derived from completed and 
current ACTD programs? 
D. DISCUSSION 
The past decade has seen true acquisition reform measures taken in an effort to 
overcome budgetary constraints and ever-changing military missions and threats. Many 
key reform areas have addressed the need to streamline the procurement process while 
others are designed to reduce costs to meet the mandate to "do more with less". One such 
measure taken that has improved each of these reform areas is the validation and 
implementation of the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Program. 
In early 1994, the Department of Defense (DoD) created the ACTD program to 
help speed the transition of maturing technology from developers to warfighting users. 
This program and process has quickly become, according to Dr. Paul G. Kaminski, then 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology {USD(A&T)}, "one of 
the fimdamental core elements in improving our acquisition system". [Ref. 43:p. 1] The 
ACTD program involves many elements of today's acquisition reform initiatives. As 
mentioned before, ACTDs help to streamline the acquisition process while cutting costs. 
They are a break from the traditional approach under which a developer first develops 
then produces and subsequently delivers the product to the end user. ACTD programs 
take full advantage of the Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) approach 
and involve joint Service cooperation to afford the warfighting end user the opportunity 
to perform early and extensive operational assessments of the product before a great deal 
of fimds are invested in the project. Additionally, upon completion of the ACTD there is 
3 
usually some residual operational capability that might be utilized even if it is decided 
that the program is not yet ready to go into the full development production. 
ACTD programs were initially viewed as having a nominal duration of two to 
four years for transition to a user-operated system and acquisition program. Now, in 
1998, DoD is nearing the end of the expected completion cycle for the first ACTDs 
approved in 1995. This study concentrates on the use of the different contracting 
methods used in the three classes of the Department of Defense (DoD) ACTD Program 
and examines them for their relative success or failure. Each class of ACTD's unique 
characteristics, procedlITal and decision processes, and actual or predicted outcomes is 
considered and used to evaluate contracting methods employed by DoD in ACTD 
programs. 
E. SCOPE, AUDIENCE AND BENEFITS OF THESIS 
The scope of this thesis includes: (1) a review of the formal acquisition process; 
(2) an examination of various ACTD program's processes and procedures; (3) a contrast· 
and comparison of ACTD processes with normal acquisition procedures; (4) an analysis 
of the current issues involved in ACTD programs; and (5) an examination of the ACTD 
program classes for contracting methods that are being, and can be, applied by 
Government Contracting Officers in current and future ACTD program acquisitions. 
The audience for this thesis includes DoD policy makers, program managers, and 
contracting officers. The emphasis of this thesis is to examine the contracting methods 
that are and may be used in the three classes of ACTDs. These methods are used to 
formulate general contracting method guidelines and recommendations for use in future 
ACTDs. It is hoped that this research and the respIting analysis and recommendations 
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might assist Government and industry contracting personnel make more informed ACTD 
acquisition decisions. 
F. METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 
The methodology used in this thesis consists of the following: 
1. Conduct a literature search of books, magazine articles, Federal 
regulations, case studies, CD-ROM system literature, Internet, and Dudley 
Knox and Acquisition library information resources at the Naval 
Postgraduate School regarding the topic of current and previous ACTDs. 
2. Conduct a thorough review of the standard formal acquisition process and 
compare that process with the ACTD acquisition process. 
3. Conduct electronic mail correspondence as well as personal and phone 
interviews of key personnel involved in completed and current ACTDs 
and ACTD initiatives to ascertain further insight into ACTD processes, 
challenges, and lessons learned. Conduct these interviews with a non-
attribution option to allow for a more informative critique of ongoing 
programs. 
4. Identify procedural requirements for the introduction and implementation 
of an ACTD program. 
5. Obtain and analyze various contracting methods employed in each of the 
three classes of ACTDs to assess trends of use and their relative success or 
failure in addressing the challenges presented by ACTD objectives and 
any previous lessons learned. 
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6. Evaluate the benefits and disadvantages of employing various contracting 
methods in ACTDs. 
7. Prepare standard contracting method guidelines for each ACTD class 
through transition to general acquisition programs. 
G. LIMITATIONS 
The ACTD program was created in 1994 with ACTDs typically slated for a two-
to-four year period for execution of the demonstration. The first of the ACTDs were 
initiated in early 1995. these and other ACTDs are just now at or near the end of the 
demonstration phase. With an evolving program such as the ACTD program there are 
various and differing reports of performance in the early years. Many program elements 
and contracting methods employed are varied and are, to an extent, unproven due to the 
recent creation of the program. 
Throughout the research phase of this thesis, this researcher sought to assemble as 
complete and unbiased information as possible. In this endeavor, many interviews of 
various stakeholders in the ACTD process were conducted. The interviewees were given 
the option to hold the interview on a non- attribution basis to elicit the most honest and 
forthcoming ideas, opinions, lessons learned, suggestions and criticisms involving the 
ACTD process. 
H. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II of this study provides an introduction to the traditional formal 
acquisition process and its relative advantages and disadvantages. This chapter also 
introduces the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program, its process and 
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procedures. Following their introduction, the processes of the formal and ACTD 
acquisition programs are compared and contrasted. 
Chapter III examines the possible ACTD outcomes, testing issues and challenges 
associated with the transition to formal acquisition. Also discussed are some of the 
lessons learned from the various ACTD programs and how they may impact the 
contracting process. 
Chapter IV provides a detailed analysis of the three classes of ACTDs. Examples 
of each class are delineated and discussed. Following the description of each ACTD 
class, a thorough discussion is conducted of the various contracting methods that have 
been, are being or could be utilized to facilitate the execution of the ACTDs. The reasons 
for use and relative success or failure of these methods are assessed to determine if the 
methodology is critical or mandatory to properly execute current or future programs. 
Chapter V provides a summary of the previous chapters' research, analysis and 
findings. The primary and secondary research questions are answered based upon the 
findings of this study. Additionally, this chapter provides guidelines and 
recommendations that might be employed. by Government contracting personnel in 
contracting for future ACTDs. Finally, this chapter lists areas for further ACTD research. 
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II. BACKGROUND ON ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY 
DEMONSTRATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It should be noted from the outset that the ACTD process is not a substitute for a 
traditional, formal acquisition program. The traditional defense acquisition process 
remains the principal method for procuring new and upgraded military capabilities. The 
ACTD process was intended to be, and has become, a pre-acquisition activity' and 
facilitating element to the formal process. [Ref. 66: p. 1] 
B. ACTD DESCRIPTION 
An ACTD is a joint effort between the acquisition and warfighting communities 
and is intended to exploit mature and maturing technologies to assist in solving identified 
military needs and problems. The major point of emphas~s is to provide 'quick respons~s 
to validated military requirements. [Ref. 35:p. 1] There is an ever-increasing need to 
respond to rapidly evolving military requirements due to shrinking budgets, rapid and 
major changes in foreign threats, and fast-paced development of technology that is more 
readily available to potential adversaries. [Ref. 40,p. 1] 
ACTDs provide the warfighting end-user an opportunity to assess the military 
capability of established elements of a mature technology toward the resolution of a 
stated military need. The establishment of military capability, or lack thereof, is then 
used in the decisions of whether to proceed with a formal acquisition process and, if so, 
where the entry point should be in that process. [Ref. 35:p. 1] 
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C. TRADITIONAL DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS 
1. Background 
When the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Circular No. A-I09, 
Major System Acquisition, in 1976 it established a policy that would govern the 
acquisition of major systems in all executive branch agencies, including the Department 




are directed at and critical to fulfilling an agency mission, 
entail the allocation of relatively large resources, and 
warrant special management attention. 
The various Circular A-I 09 policies and procedures relevant to Government 
agencies and departments in acquiring defense systems were delineated and implemented 
by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 34, Major System Acquisition. Further 
policies and procedures intended for DoD are provided in DoD Directive.5000.1, Defense 
Acquisition, and DoD Regulation 5000.2R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAP) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) 
Acquisition Programs. These two documents we~e issued in 1996 and incorporate some 
of the initiatives of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (F ASA), representing a 




The establishment of any major defense program begins with a 
determination of the DoD mission. After this analysis there must be a determination of 
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mission needs. The issue of what is needed to carry out the established mission becomes 
paramount. [Ref. 59:pp. 1, 5] As discussed below, this determination involves the 
various stakeholders in the process and, as much as possible, industry. 
While more recent directives have been published governing DoD-specific 
acquisitions, the basic model for the initiation and phases of major systems acquisition 
are still presented by OMB Circular A-109. The following model (Figure 1) represents a 
complex acquisition process and is intended to apply to major projects. The model, 
created by Professor Stanley N. Sherman, summarizes the main phases and decisions that 
Government agencies must include in their acquisition strategies. [Ref. 74:p. 227] 
Major Systems Acquisition Cycle 
Evaluation and 
reconc i 1 iat ion 
of needs in 
/ 
context of agency 
mission, resources 














Figure 1: Major Systems Acquisition Cycle 
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The emphasis of the Circular A-109 model is to stress the early and 
integrated involvement of management in determining mission needs and goals and the 
direction that research and development efforts should take to achieve them. Integrated 
efforts are also tasked with establishing the program's budgeting, contracting and 
management programs with an eye toward increased involvement of the private sector. 
Finally the model is designed to de-emphasize early commitments to full-scale 
development and production while establishing and maintaining early communication 
with Congress regarding agency mission needs and goals. [Ref. 74:pp. 227-228] 
b. Milestones and Phases 
Following the. mission need determination DoD begins the painstaking 
task of determining the requirements necessary to meet the established need and develop 
a program structure ... A program structure indicates the phases and milestone decisi<?n 
points established for a program. First a general concept of the requirement is 
established. Then the phases and milestone decision points help to convert the broad 
mission needs into more specific performance requirements. It is from these specifics 
that a Statement of Work (SOW) is created for the system and, ultimately, a stable design 
is conceived. [Ref. 31.pp. 1-2] 
The DoD 5000 series instructions provide a general model (illustrated 
below) with major milestone decision points and phases of the acquisition process. This 
model provides a basis for comprehensive management and progressive decision making 
associated with program maturation. All programs must accomplish certain core 
activities but the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) can tailor milestones and phases 
to support the specific acquisition situation. This tailoring process is dependent on the 
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complexity of the item or acquisition (for example, some activities apply only to 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) I but not AcAT IA programs). How these activities are 
conducted is based on a program by program basis through the Integrated Product Team 
(IPT) process. [Ref. 24:Part 1, p. 3] 
:-DETERMNATiON: '---P-HASE--O---' .------, ,-----, '---P-HASE-.---' : - - - - - - - - : ~ - - - - - - - - ~ 
; OF MISSION I , OPERATIONAl.. I bElollUTARIZAllO!l/ 
,... - - - - - - ~ -. NEED , CONCEPT FIELDING I I SlJ>PORT " & 
: sa~NCE' -:- - - - - - - • EXPlORATION DEPLOWENT & I :: DISPOSAl. : 
, TEC~OLOO'V , O~~~~~N/lI. I , I 
, - - .. - - - - _.. t ______ ... __ I 1 __ _ ... _____ ! 
• MAVINCLUDE LOWAATE INITI.oL 
PROOUCTION (!.RIP) 
[General Acquisition Guidelines, DAD, Version 2.3, Mar 98] 
Figure 2: General Acquisition Guidelines 
The initial milestone (Milestone 0) is the program's Concept Studies 
Approval. Following a validation of a program's mission need there is an approval to 
enter the process of concept study. Approval by the Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA) at this milestone does not mean that a new acquisition program has been initiated, 
but rather that the program can enter Phase O. [Ref. 24:Part 1, p. 5] 
Phase 0 is the Concept Exploration Phase for a program, which usually 
includes competitive, parallel short-term concept studies. The purpose of these studies is 
to identify and evaluate the feasible alternative concepts and establish the basic measures 
to be used in comparing and assessing these concepts. A proposed acquisition strategy 
should be formulated during this phase. At the conclusion of this phase the program will 
be at Milestone 1. [Ref. 24:Part 1, p. 4] 
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At Milestone I the MDA must assess the results of Phase 0 and decide 
whether those results merit the establishment of a new acquisition program. In its 
assessment the MDA will approve the following essential program elements: 
(1) an acquisition strategy; 
(2) Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) objectives; 
(3) ,an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) and, 
(4) Phase I "exit criteria" program-specific results required in the next phase. 
Following the approval of these items the program exists as a legitimate 
acquisition program and will enter Phase I. [Ref. 24:Part l,p. 6] 
Phase I for a program involves the definition of the program and an 
endeavor to reduce its various risks. Program Definition entails decisions on which 
concept(s) to examine, as well as the system design approaches, and/or parallel 
technologies, to pursue. During this phase the program defmes' its operational 
requirements, updates the Operational Requirements Document (ORD), and 'makes 
preliminary quantity decisions for Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP), when applicable. 
The objective of LRIP is to produce a minimum quantity of items necessary to provide 
articles for testing, formulate a production base for the program, allow for a orderly 
increase in production rate, and be sufficient to switch over to full-rate production after 
sufficient and satisfactory operational testing results occur. Once the exit criteria have 
been met the program will seek, at Milestone II, MDA approval to enter the Engineering 
& Manufacturing Development (EMD). [Ref. 24:Part 1, p. 4] 
At Milestone II the MDA must assess the results from Phase I and again 
determine if the program warrants continuation and, if so, whether it is ready to proceed 
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to engineering and manufacturing development. In addition to the same essential 
program elements that it approved at Milestone I, the MDA may, as applicable, grant 
approval for the program to enter into LRIP and approve the proposed LRIP quantities. 
Following approval of these elements the program may enter Phase II. [Ref. 24:Part 1, p. 
6] 
Engineering and manufacturing development occur during Phase II. The 
principle objectives of this phase are as follows: 
(1) translate the best design approach into a stable, interoperable, producible, 
supportable, and cost-effective design; 
(2) validate the manufacturing or production process, and 
(3) demonstrate the capability of the design through testing. 
If anticipated and previously approved, LRIP occurs during the latter half 
of this phase. These production items are essential in the testing and design refinement 
phases of the program as it prepares to meet Milestone III. [Ref. 24:Part 1, p. 4] 
In the fmal milestone, Milestone III, the MDA approves the program's 
intended production or fielding/deployment. The MDA must assess the results from 
Phase II and specifically approve the program's Acquisition Strategy, APB and Phase III 
exit criteria before Phase III may begin. [Ref. 24:Part 1, p. 6] 
Phase III, the Production, FieldinglDeployment phase, involves the 
essential task of achieving operational capability of a system that meets the original 
requirements established from the mission need. During this phase additional testing will 
take place and continuous assessment of capability occurs. If flaws occur or necessary 
changes are identified there could be modifications made to the system. Any such 
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changes/modifications that are considered to be minor and within the original scope of 
the acquisition are made part of the program being modified. If, however, the 
modification is of such cost or complexity that the work could, itself, qualify as an ACAT 
I or ACAT IA program then it will be considered a separate acquisition action. [Ref. 
24:Part 1, pp. 4-5] 
Operational Support and Demilitarization are the remaining stages of the 
program acquisition. While they do not represent phases of the program they are indeed 
essential elements of any program. Operational support contemplates follow-on testing 
and the transition of mllterial and training support from contractor to Government support 
if necessary. Demilitarization and Disposal contemplates the issues of what is to be done 
with the system at the end of its useful life. The Program Manager (PM) and Contracting 
Officer must adequately plan in advance for this eventuality. [Ref. 24: Part 1, p. 5] 
c. Risk Management and Concerns 
An essential element of any acquisition process is the mitigation of risk., 
DoD Program Managers traditionally use cost, schedule, and performance parameters to 
control and measure the success of their programs. Awareness of the primary areas of 
risk in cost, schedule and performance is becoming more prevalent. Recently, proactive 
risk management has been a major point of emphasis as evidenced in the latest DoD 5000 
Series directives and the Defense Acquisition Deskbook. [Ref. 55:pp. 1-2] 
The DoD 5000.2R, Part 3, requires Major Defense Acquisition Program 
(MDAP) Program Managers to "establish a risk management program for each 
acquisition program to identify and control performance, cost and schedule risks". [Ref. 
24:Part 3, p. 6] The program should identify t4e risk drivers, define risk reduction 
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measures and provide continuous risk assessment throughout the acquisition process. 
Risk reduction measures should be included in cost-performance trade-offs and the 
program should include back-tip plans in high risk areas. [Ref. 24:Part 3, p. 6] 
In 1997 the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & 
Acquisition) surveyed forty-one Navy programs to collect information on the 
implementation of risk management. This total represented 18% of all active programs 
and was broken down as 48% ACAT I, 27% ACAT II, 11% ACAT III, and 13% ACAT 
IV. The results show a significant emphasis on the subject and in their implementation of 
Risk management measures: 
• Approximately half of the programs surveyed' did not have Risk 
Management plans; however, all ACAT I programs (with one exception) 
had Risk Management plans. 
• Although a majority of ACAT II through ACAT IV programs lacked 
formal Risk Management plans, they included Risk Management criteria 
in their program management plans. These criteria are applied during 
periodic assessments. 
• Few programs had formal Risk Management training programs, yet most 
program offices indicated that some type of training would be beneficial. 
• All programs with Risk Management plans used defined criteria, rather 
than subjective assessments, for High, Medium, and Low Risk ratings. 
• All ACAT I programs had contractual requirements for a Risk 
Management program; few ACAT II, III and IV programs had such a 
requirement. 
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• Three programs, all ACAT I, used the concept of an independent Risk 
Assessment team. [Ref. 55:pp. 1-2] 
As previously discussed, at each milestone decision point, assessments are 
made regarding the status of program execution and the plans for the next phase and the 
remainder of the program. During these assessments the various risks associated with the 
program and the adequacy of risk management planning are explicitly addressed. 
Additionally, the exit criteria are established and approved prior to the commencement of 
each phase. [Ref. 24:Part 3, pp. 2-3] 
The systematic review and control of the program from the various levels 
of the chain of command are inherent risk reduction measures established for all major 
system acquisitions. Acquisition authorities act to ensure that contracts are structured so 
that milestone decisions are made well before expenditure of funds on activities in 
subsequent phases. The objective is to provide fiscal controls without delaying the 
acquisition decisions or contracts. [Ref. 31 :pp. 1-2] 
Further risk reduction efforts are made within the particular phases. Phase 
o involves a great deal of market research and the formulation and use of Integrated 
Product Teams (IPTs) to look objectively for the most capable and practical solutions to 
the mission need. By opening the acquisition to the various concepts for examination and 
evaluation, the valued concept of competition is introduced/applied to the process and a 
measure of cost and performance risk is lessened. CAIV objectives are also identified 
during Phase I. Their implementation and use are a principal cost-risk mitigation 
measure for any program. Additional Phase I risk reduction measures include the initial 
product testing, usually of prototypes, and demonstration. The ability to examine a 
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prototype in use helps defray the three major risks where the Government can assess, 
early in the process, the feasibility of use and any major design changes required. The 
principal risk reduction measure in Phase II is the introduction of LRIP. This process 
allows both the contractor and the Government to reduce and monitor, in a sequential 
manner, the production process and the feasibility of the system. Finally, Phase III 
efforts to redu~e risks include operational testing and evaluation. Although late in the 
acquisition process, these measures are still effective in reducing the risks to the 
Government in the long run especially where life cycle performance and cost elements 
are considered. 
The risk management measures inherent in the formal acquisition process 
do present some concerns. The principal concerns are lengthy cycle time and 
"requirements creep". Cycle time reduction has become a major concern in the military 
with Secretary of Defense Cohen's challenge to reduce acquisition cycle time by 50% by 
the year 2000. [Ref. 46:p. 79] This challenge has been issued in part because studies of 
cycle time reductions have resulted in significant cost and quality improvements. The 
lengthy nature of the formal acquisition process hinders the ability to capitalize on these 
savings and improvements. [Ref. 13:p. 176] Also of concern are the cost increases and 
delivery delays caused by "requirements creep" - a circumstance where system demands 
increase incrementally as it goes through the acquisition process. Again, the longer the 
process, the greater the risk of this phenomenon. [Ref. 16:p. 16] 
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3. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Traditional Acquisition Process 
a. Advantages 
There are many advantages to the methods involved in the traditional 
acquisition process. The following paragraphs will list and discuss a few of the major 
advantages. 
Acquisition personnel have a great deal of familiarity with the process. 
This presents a distinct advantage in the experience and comfort that they bring to the 
process. The various requirements in the process are known to personnel and have, over 
the course oftime, been refined and amended to best serve the Government's interests. 
Another advantage is the amount of review and oversight involved in the 
process. In any acquisition of major cost or complexity there is risk. Oversight and 
consistent program review can help evaluate and mitigate the risk involved. There are 
many checks and balances built into the process in the form of MDA reviews, Defense 
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) reviews, DoD 5000 Series Milestone and Phase 
requirements, and public scrutiny. Again, the reduction of risk through extensive 
oversight helps to serve the Government and thus the public's interests. 
A final advantage to address is the ability of Program Managers and 
acquisition personnel to tailor the process to best accommodate the acquisition. The 
"advent of the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) and the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (F ASA) has led to cost and time· savings in the traditional acquisition 
process. Tailoring allows the use of the traditional risk reduction measures while still 
working within a familiar and refined process. 
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h. Disadvantages 
Ironically one of the principal disadvantages to the traditional acquisition 
process is also one of its advantages: the amount of review and oversight. Due to the 
amount of cycle time involved in these and other traditional DoD acquisition process 
measures, the process can become laborious and costly. Commercial acquisition and 
program management studies have proven that if cycle time can be driven down, cost and 
quality will improve. [Ref. 13:p. 176] The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) has recognized 
this potential and recently challenged DoD upper management to cut cycle time by 50% 
by the year 2000. This initiative will have to overcome many obstacles including the 
established mindset entrenched in the DoD acquisition community. [Ref. 46:pp. 79-80] 
During this period of great global change the extreme length of an 
acquisition program can create a significant competitive disadvantage. By forgoing 
short-term solutions for longer-term, major systems solutions, DoD can jeopardize the 
military capability to combat new more advanced technological forces and threats. [Ref. 
63] The average ACAT I acquisition is currently running approximately llO months to 
completion. No one can predict with exact accuracy what threats will be most prominent 
or what world conditions will exist in 10 years and yet we are procuring weapon systems 
based on that premise. [Ref. 63] 
The preceding sections examined major formal acquisition process 
advantages and disadvantages. These advantages and disadvantages are addressed once 
again in this chapter as they are used in a comparison of the formal acquisition process 
and the ACTD acquisition processes. 
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D. ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS 
1. Background 
A declining budget, significant changes in threats, and an 
acceleration in the pace of technology development have 
created challenges to our ability to adequately respond to 
rapidly evolving military needs. In addition, the global 
proliferation of military technologies, resulting in relatively 
easy access to these technologies by potential adversaries, 
has further increased the need to rapidly transition new 
capabilities from the developer to the user. [Ref. 40:p. 1] 
The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program evolved as 
a response to recommendations of the Packard Commission of 1986 and the Defense 
Science Boards of 1987, 1990, and 1991. [Ref. 40:p. 1] The Packard Commission 
outlined the problem in 1986 by stating that "too many of our weapons systems cost too 
much, take too long to develop, and - by the time they are fielded - incorporate obsolete 
technology". In early 1994, the DoD initiated the program and designed it to help 
expedite the transfer of maturing technology from the developer to the military warfighter 
and help the DoD acquisition process adapt to today's economic and threat environments. 
[Ref. 40:p. 1] There are currently 43 active ACTD program ranging in cost estimates 
from $750,000 to $950 million. [Ref. 63] 
a. Purpose 
The ACTD process was developed to quickly convert new or 
technologically superior capabilities to the warfighter in the field. The process 
emphasizes the integration, rather than the development, of technology and the real 
operational capability of the system as it is actually made part of military deployments. 
[Ref. 77:p. 13] The warfighter is provided a prototype capability that is to be evaluated 
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through extensive use in real military exercises and "at a scale size sufficient to fully 
assess military utility". [Ref. 40:p. 1] 
ACTDs are designed to allow users to gain an 
understanding of proposed new capabilities for which there 
is no user experience base. Specifically, they are designed 
to allow the warfighter an opportunity to 
develop and refine the associated concept of 
operations to fully exploit the capability under evaluation, 
evolve the operational requirements as experience 
and understanding of the capability are developed, 
and operate militarily useful qual:ttities of prototype 
systems in .realistic military exercises, and on that basis to 
make an assessment of the military utility of the proposed 
capa~ility. [Ref. 40:p. 1] 
The ACTD process promotes a solid understanding of the operational 
utility prior to any full-scale procurement effort by allowing the military end-users the 
opportunity to provide their input. [Ref. 77:p. 13] Dr. Paul Kaminski, former 
USD(A&T), summarized the purpose of ACTDs as follows: 
The intent is for ACTDs to marry technology and the 
related employment doctrine. This marriage, I think, is the 
one thing that we have not given adequate attention to in 
the Department in the past. We have traditionally 
underestimated the importance of developing the 
appropriate doctrine and the tactics for the employment of 
technology along with the related training of the people 
who will use the system. [Ref. 43:p. 2] 
h. ACTD Classes 
Policymakers within the Office of the Secretary of Defense recognized 
that there are varying degrees of complexity involved with the many systems in ACTDs. 
To aid in the organization and management of these various systems, DUSD(AT) created 
and defined three classes of ACTDs. [Ref. 77:p. 15] The three classes were divided on 
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the basis of the base technology involved and the long-term plan for the system. [Ref. 
16:p. 12] 
Class I ACTDs were defined by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
for Advanced Technology {DUSD(AT)} as "software or workstation" items. [Ref. 77:p. 
15] This class of ACTD usually consists of information systems with specifically 
designed software operating through commercial workstations. Generally they are 
required in small quantities and often the military need can be filled with little or· no 
further development or production required. [Ref. 34:p. A32] 
Class II ACTDs were defined by the DUSD(AT) as "stand-alone 
systems". [Ref. 77:p. 15] The systems associated with this class of ACTD are most 
closely related to the types of systems typically procured through the formal acquisition 
process. They are primarily weapon or sensor systems. and in many ·cases "will b~ 
planned to transition into LRIP following the ACTD". [Ref. 34:p. A32-A33] 
Class III ACTDs were defined by the DUSD(AT) as a "system of 
systems" [Ref. 77:p. 15]. Class III ACTDs generally involve several "weapons systems 
integrated within an overarching framework" [Ref. 77:p. 15]. 
An indi:vidual element within the overall architecture of a 
Class III ACTD may be a fielded system, a system already 
in acquisition, or a system emerging from the technology 
base. The overall ACTD may involve multiple Program 
Executive Officers, and perhaps multiple Military 
Departments. The challenge may therefore be to integrate 
and coordinate the individual transitions to achieve the 




(1) Need Identification and Industry Response. At the 
beginning of each fiscal year ACTD initiation begins with a data call from the 
DUSD(AT) to the Service Research and Development (R&D) and warfighting 
communities. Responses are due the following January. The responses from R&D 
representatives usually propose candidates that reflect capability of mature technology 
that can be applied to a military requirement. The warfighters respond with a descriptive, 
prioritized list of needs that mayor may not include a proposed solution. When there is 
no proposed solution, the staff for DUSD(AT) will work with the R&D community to 
identify possible candidate solutions. However, when the submission is "in the form of a 
statement of need, a response must be formulated, either as an extension of existing 
capability or as a new capability". This is important to document because, if the 
formulation of a concept does not start until formal ACID submission, there could be 
significant delay in defining, evaluating and approving the ACTD. [Ref. 33: p. 2] 
(2) Submission. ~e DUSD(AT) is responsible for the 
collection of submissions, selection and approval of ACTDs. The ideal situation for any 
candidate for consideration/submission is to have a unified user/developer team that has 
combined an operational need with a mature technology. The DUSD(AT) staff can then 
assist in the team development and clarification of the criteria and refinement of the 
concept. [Ref. 3 :p. 2] 
(3) Selection. Once an ACTD concept has been fully defined, 
a briefing of the ACTD is presented to DUSD(AT). At this point the ACTD is either 
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accepted for further discussion, returned with guidance for refinement, or rejected. [Ref. 
3:p.2] The focus of the evaluation is based on three major areas: response to user needs, 
maturity of technologies, and potential effectiveness. [Ref. 40:p. 4] 
User needs: ACTDs focus on addressing critical military 
needs. To evaluate proposed solutions to meet these needs, 
intense user involvement is required. ACTDs place mature 
technologies in the hands of the user and then conduct 
realistic and extensive military exercises to provide the user 
an opportunity to evaluate utility and gain experience with 
the capability. The process provides the users a basis for 
evaluating and refining their operational requirements, for 
developing a corresponding concept of operations, and 
ultimately for developing a sound understanding of the 
military utility of the proposed solution before a decision is 
made to enter into the formal acquisition process. 
Furthermore, a key objective of ACTDs is to provide a 
residual operational capability for the warfighter as an 
interim solution prior to procurement. 
Exploit mature technologies: ACTDs are based on 
mature or" nearly" mature technologies. By limiting 
consideration to mature technologies, the ACTD avoids the 
time and risks associated with technology development, 
concentrating instead on integration and demonstration 
activities. This approach permits an early user 
demonstration on a greatly reduced schedule at a reduced 
cost. 
Potential effectiveness: The potential or projected 
effectiveness must be sufficient to warrant consideration of 
an ACTD or the capability must address a need for which 
there is no suitable solution. [Ref. 40:p. 4] 
Once an ACTD passes this stage, it is briefed to an advisory board 
consisting of senior acquisition and operational executives made up of representatives 
from the warfighting, Advanced Research, and Science & Technology communities. 
This board is known as the Advanced Technology Breakfast Club. [Ref. 63] The 
Breakfast Club reviews and assesses the ACTD based selection criteria, which are 
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intended to be guidance for the formulation of ACTD candidates as well as structure for 
the process of ACTD selection. [Ref. 33: p. 2] The ACTD Selection Criteria as outlined 
in the Guidelines for ACTD Formulation were established by the DUSD(AT) and are 
provided in full text in Appendix A. The following is a synopsis of the criteria: 
• The timeframe for completing the evaluation of military utility is 
typically 2-4 years. This timeframe provides sufficient time to design and 
assemble functional prototypes for warfighters to evaluate. The timelines 
should be kept as short as practical, allowing less time for less complex or 
readily available systems (e.g. Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) items) 
or longer for more complex systems. [Ref. 33: p. 2] 
• The technology should be sufficiently mature. ACTDs should begin 
with "mature or relatively mature technology and should be evaluated with 
a focus on military utility of the proposed capability. Maturity of the 
technology ensures the timeframe requirements are more readily met as' 
development of technology can create schedule uncertainty. The 
assessment of military utility of ACTD items often involves the 
involvement of large military forces in force-on-force military exercises. 
To ensure these exercises are conducted according to plan, everything 
must be available on schedule and must be capable and perform as 
predicted. [Ref. 33: p. 2] 
• Provides a potentially effective response to a priority military need. 
"The need that is being addressed by the proposed candidate must be 
clearly supported by the intended user of the capability." [Ref. 33:p. 3] 
, ' 
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Since the JROC prioritizes the ACTD candidates according to military 
need, the candidate ACTDs should concentrate on presenting reasonably 
cost-effective capabilities to meet military needs that will be given priority 
in that forum. [Ref. 33: p. 3] 
• The User signs up to be intimately involved in the ACTD. 
Userlwarfighter sponsorship involvement is essential to the success of an 
ACTD. Since it will be the warfighter who conducts the military utility of 
the system no ACTD can even be initiated without a commitment from a 
warfighting element to perform that assessment and fully participate in the 
ACTD. [Ref. 33: p. 3] 
• A lead Service/Agency has been designated. Without exception, 
ACTDs will not be approved without a lead Service/Agency that has 
accepted responsibility for transition preparation at the end of the ACTD. 
This transition planning is essential and comes under the lead 
Service/Agency since it will be that entity that will, in almost every case, 
take responsibility of the capab!lity after the demonstration and make the 
decision whether to proceed to formal acquisition. [Ref. 33: p. 3] 
• The risks have been identified, are understood and accepted. Risks 
will be involved in any ACTD, especially technical risks inherent in 
engineering and system integration. Other risks to be identified and 
assessed are programmatic risks (e.g. cost and schedule), and operational 
risks. [Ref. 33: p. 3] 
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• Demonstrations or exercises have been identified that will provide an 
adequate basis for the utility assessment. The principal element of an 
ACTD is the warfighter's military utility assessment. A more broad 
assessment than normal operational testing, "military utility is defmed as: 
(a) effectiveness in performing the mission, (b) suitability for use by the 
user, and (c) the overall impact the proposed capability has on the conflict 
or military operations". [Ref. 33: p. 4] 10 be effective, the conditions of 
the assessment must be as realistic as possible, stressing both the 
equipment, and its operation. The candidate ACTD should propose new 
exercises/demonstrations or identify current exercises/demonstrations to 
meet the assessment requirements. [Ref. 33: p. 4] 
• Funding is sufficient to complete the planned assessment of utility and 
to provide technical support for the first two years of fielding of the 
interim capability. The budget submitted as part of the proposed ACTD 
must identify (1) all design and development costs of the prototype 
system, (2) any additional units required, (3) all exercises that are to be 
paid by the project, and (4) all test support costs required to support the 
military utility assessment. The budget must also include transition 
planning costs and technical support cost for the first two years of fielding 
the residuals. The participating technology programs primarily fund 
ACTDs with supplemental funding (typically about 10% of the total cost 
of the ACTD) from the DUSD/AT funding line, as appropriate. [Ref. 33: 
p.4] 
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• Developer is ready to prepare a plan that covers all essential aspects. 
An ACTD Management Plan presented to the DUSD(AT) for final 
signature within 90 days following approval of an ACTD. This 
Management Plan should be coordinated and approved by all principal 
participants early in the ACTD process. [Ref. 33: pp. 4-5] 
These criteria are not exhaustive. The Advanced Technology 
Breakfast Club will consider other factors to better ascertain the ACTD's ability to meet 
the objectives of the program. Other major factors that should be considered include 
affordability, interoperability, sustainability, and evolutionary capability. Affordability 
centers on the total ownership cost (TO C) perspective. Interoperability is an important 
consideration, especially when the item is a new capability that is be used on the future 
battlefield. Sustainability is an essential element for con~ideration since" items involv~d 
in ACTDs will remain in the field. Finally, the concept of evolutionary capability should 
be considered. This concept centers on the idea that the item will provide an initial 
capability that can be utilized and developed and modified as technology or threats 
evolve. [Ref. 33: p. 5] 
-Once the Advanced Technology Breakfast Club (ATIBC) has 
evaluated an ACTD candidate it will be presented to the Joint Staff, through the 
appropriate Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment (JWCA). This tribunal will use the 
ACTD Selection Criteria and additional factors in its review, assessment and comment. 
[Ref. 3 :p. 2] The DUSD(AT) will consider the recommendations and comments of the 
ATIBC and Joint Staff and determine whether to retain the ACTD candidate and forward 
it for presentation to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC will 
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review all candidates received and prioritize them based on their relative ranking in terms 
of military need. Following the JROC prioritization, the information on the remaining 
candidates is forwarded to the Congressional Authorization and Appropriations 
Committee for their committee marks. [Ref. 33: p. 7] 
A final review, termed the "Final Scrub", is then conducted 
just prior to the start of the fiscal year of those candidates 
.ranked by the Joint Staff and OSD as most deserving of 
ACTD status. The focus of this review is once again on the 
election criteria, with the addition of two other topics; 
transition strategy and proposed ACTD management 
structure. Once all final reviews of the viable candidate 
have been completed, a final ACTD selection list is 
established by the DUSD(AT). This ACTD list is then 
coordinated with the Vice Chairman, JCS and the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) before 
the final ACTD Implementation Directives for the 
approved ACTDs are signed by the DUSD(AT). [Ref. 33: 
p.7] 
The following figure is a flowchart that diagrams the entire ACTD 
formulation and approval process including selection and funding. [Ref. 3 :p. 2] 
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b. Management 
(1) Staffing. "Each ACTD is managed by a Lead Service or 
Agency developer and driven by the principal User-Sponsor" [Ref. 40:p. 5]. As a result 
of the lessons learned from the Medium Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV), "Predator" ACTD, the Lead Service is now required to be named prior to the 
approval of an ACTD. [Ref. 63] The Lead Service must define the operational 
requirements of the ACTD prior to any acquisition decision [Ref. 29] and is "a 
significant contributor of funding" [Ref; 52]. The User-Sponsor is almost always a 
command and is usually a Unified Commander. This User-Sponsor provides to the 
ACTD the warfighter's perspective. The JROC will make recommendations to 
DUSD(AT) regarding the Lead Service designate as part of their review and comments 
on ACTDs. Since all user and developer organizations are represented on the oversight 
groups chaired by DUSD(AT) they are capable of quickly and properly deciding on 
issues critical to the direction and organization of candidate ACTDs. [Ref. 40:p. 5] 
The other major staffing involves the members and structure of the 
ACTD Management Team. Per ACTD policy, each.ACTD must have an Operational 
Manager (OM), designated by the User-Sponsor, and a Technical Manager (TM), 
designated by the Lead Service. [Ref. 63] The joint managers are tasked to use 
Integrated Product Teams (lPTs) to manage the process and be "expediters to accomplish 
traditional tasks, to some level of completion, on a non-traditional timeline". [Ref. 47:p. 
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15] The Technical Manager, formally known as a Demonstration Manager, is also to 
serve as a Co-Chair, with the DUSD (AT), of the DevelopmentILRIP Transition IPT. 
[Ref. 63] 
(2) Management Plan. The last step in the ACTD initiation 
phase is the completion, presentation and approval of the ACTD Management Plan. This 
plan is a major element for the overall management of the ACTD. The Management Plan 
should provide a baseline· program definition, as well as conditions under which 
operational use and technical concepts can be· refined and traded off before, and in 
preparation for, entering the formal acquisition process. [Ref. 34:p. 15] 
The ACTD Management Plan provides for each ACTD a 
top-level description of the demonstration with sufficient 
detail that the vital objectives, approach, critical events, 
participants, schedule, fimding, and transition objectives 
are understood and (by endorsement) agreed upon by all 
relevant parties. Measures of evaluation, to be considered 
in addressing both effectiveness and suitability of the 
capability being evaluated, should be clearly defined. [Ref. 
34:p. 15] 
The Management Plan should be modified throughout the ACID 
process but only significant modifications, such as significant budget and schedule 
changes, would require approval by the ACTD's Oversight Group. [Ref. 34:p. 15] 
(3) Budgeting. The principal issue in ACTD budgeting 
process is to determine the amount and timing of fimds available for the ACTD and any 
follow-on acquisitions. The majority of fimding for any ACTD is through the Lead 
Service and is fimded within the appropriate President's Budget. There are additional 
fimds provided by DUSD (AT) for ACTD integration expenses and residual capability 
technical support. [Ref. 7] Cost As an Independent Variable will be implemented in the 
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development contract. Funding is to be reviewed annually by the joint managers who 
will submit reports and recommendations to the Oversight Panel for review and 
concurrence. [Ref. 34:p. A22] 
Funding for the complete ACTD must be identified and 
committed for all fiscal years included. However, unlike 
the case for a formal acquisition phase decision, out-year 
funding beyond the ACTD demonstration phase and its 
two-year follow-on phase need not be committed. The 
funding from each participating party will be listed for the 
FYDP and POM cycles, with detail down to the Program 
Element (PE) and Project level. Advanced planning may 
be required to ensure adequate funding for an ACTD is 
provided in the Presidents Budget submission. The funding 
baselin~ should include all funds required for completion of 
the ACTD and, separately identified, the funding of 
supporting S&T efforts which are essential to the ACTD. 
The purpose of the latter is to identify the funding required 
to assure successful completion of the demonstration. 
Once this baseline Plan has been agreed to by all 
participating parties, changes to the funding plan, including 
the supporting S&T portion, will be made only with the 
understanding and concurrence of the Oversight Group. 
[Ref. 34:p. A22] 
Following the ACTD, the ACTD residual item(s) will remain in 
the field and a decision will be made as to whether to continue procurement of additional 
item(s). If the program successfully transitions to formal acquisition then there may be a 
requirement for additional funding. [Ref. 63] 
(4) Transition. For an ACTD which demonstrates strong 
military utility and for which there is additional operational requirement, the intent is to 
transition the procurement into the formal acquisition process. [Ref. 61 :p. 1] "The 
objective is to transition into the acquisition phase without a loss of momentum" [Ref. 
29]. This transition must be properly planned to avoid a costly, and ACTD process-
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defeating, delay that could occur from an occurrence such as a break in the production 
lines. [Ref. 61 p. 1] 
"Transition Planning includes both transition of residuals, and 
transition to acquisition" [Ref. 29]. While transition occurs at the end of the ACTD, its 
goals are established at the beginning and are overseen by a Transition Integration 
Product Team (TIPT). [Ref. 29] "The key to a successful transition is getting the 
acquisition community and the user community working together early through· an 
integrated product team (lPT)" [Ref. 57:p. 33] 
The TIPT is co-chaired by a representative from 
ODUSD/AT and the ACTD Technical Manger. (Lead 
Service representation is required, especially if the ACTD 
is going to transi.tion to a Service-managed program.) The 
TIPT includes representation from all of the stakeholders in 
the ACTD to include the User-Sponsor, the Lead Service, 
the developer(s), the supportability comml;lllity, the Joint 
Staff, Office of Department of Operational Testing and 
Evaluation (ODOT&E), and the operational test agencies, 
as well as the OSD and service staff elements that will be 
involved in the formal milestone review that occurs at the 
end of the ACTD. [Ref. 61:p. 9] 
The principal areas for planning that must be addressed by the 
TIPT are: Operational Requirements Document (ORD) preparation; Interoperability 
issues; Affordability; Documentation requirements; Funding; Contracting issues; Utility 
Assessment during Test &Evaluation; and Supportability. [Ref. 29] Figure 4 depicts the 
overall framework for ACTD Transition Planning and illustrates the strong role it plays 
in th~ formulation phase, the key issues considered by TIPTs, and the major reviews held 
near the end of the ACTD process. [Ref. 61 :pp. 9-10] 
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Figure 4: Framework for ACTD Transition Planning 
c. Risk Management and Concerns 
As discussed previously, an essential element of any acquisition 
process is the mitigation of risk. [Ref. 55:pp. 1-2] The governing principle behind 
ACTDs is the ability to, in essence, "fly before you buy". The nature of any 
demonstration program is to reduce the risks in the acquisition process. The buyers in 
these programs are more informed and more likely to' ensure that operational 
requirements are met by those items chosen for procurement beyond the demonstration 
phase. [Ref. 26: p. 1] 
Another risk mitigation method that is employed in ACTDs is the use, 
rather than the development, of relatively mature technology. The technical risk is 
managed and minimized since the higher risks are not in the "core system" [Ref. 52]. 
ACTDs intend to demonstrate mature or emerging technologies within two to four years. 
This also limits the amount of funds at risk as ACTD funds are to be used to seek use for, 
or integrate technologies already in existence. [Ref. 26: p. 2] 
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The operational risks are also reduced in ACTDs. The fonner 
USD(A&T), Dr. Kaminski, acknowledged that, in using newly developed technology, the 
technical risk is low, not knowing how to utilize that technology can produce high 
operational risks. That is why, Kaminski says, "the emphasis in an ACTD is on the 
operational concept, not the technology". [Ref. 42:p. 1] 
In many cases, the technology may turn out to be 
operationally useful. The demonstration approach is still 
attractive because, for a modest investment, we would 
know what the shortcomings are and have a chance to try 
again. Even in situations where the applications look very 
promising, getting prototypes into the hands of the user 
early in the acquisition process gives us an opportunity to 
factor important operational considerations into subsequent 
acquisition decisions. [Ref. 42:p. 1] 
Risk reduction methods employed by the fonnal acquisition process are 
also present in ACTD programs. Should the ACTD transition occur the program would 
enter a fonnal acquisition phase, thus adopting the risk mitigation methods nonnally 
expected in the fonnal acquisition process including LRIP. As it is with the Ionnal 
acquisition process, CAIV initiatives are also made part of the ACTD acquisition process. 
"Their implementation and use are a principal cost-risk mitigation measure for any 
program." [Ref. 33:p. AI9] Similar to the fonnal process reviews at each milestone there 
are periodic risk assessments made regarding each ACTD by the ACTD Oversight Group 
headed by the DUSD(AT). [Ref. 33: p. AI] 
A final risk reduction method involved in ACTDs is employed by a jointly 
sponsored Infonnation Warfare Red Team. This team was established by the 
DUSD(AT), the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence (OASD)(C3I) and the Joint Staff (1-3) with a goal of 
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improving the readiness posture of the DoD. "This improvement is accomplished by 
identifying vulnerabilities in information systems and vulnerabilities caused by use of 
these information systems, then demonstrating these vulnerabilities to operators and 
developers." While this type of risk is applicable only to ACTDs that involve 
information systems, it does help to eliminate operational risks involved in the applicable 
ACTDs. [Ref 39:p. 1] 
Some risks in ACTDs will remain however, as there can be technical risks 
associated with engineering and integration work to be performed. 
The more complex the capability, the greater these risks 
tend to be. In addition, there can be programmatic risks 
(e.g. cost and schedule), as well as operational risks related 
to the acceptability of the operational concepts necessary to 
realize the full benefit of the proposed capability. These 
risks must be identified· and accepted by the primary 
stakeholders in the ACTD prior to its initiation. [Ref. 33: p. 
A7] 
Critics find some risk elements of the ACTD process to be problematic. 
One concern is that legitimate oversight is circumvented in allowing the ACTD programs 
to rapidly develop systems for use by the warfighter. The risk of overspending is 
heightened without this oversight. Another concern is proper attention is not being paid 
to the life cycle costs of building, supporting, and operating the systems beyond the initial 
phase of demonstration. [Ref. 16:p. 1] 
A final major concern is that the ACTD program has allowed questionable 
selections to proceed. The principal criticisms are that the criteria for selection are not 
well defined and are not being properly applied. The ambiguity of the criteria, especially 
that of "mature technology", has resulted in developers and future users selecting projects 
which represent a wide range of maturity levels (i.e. Low Life Cycle Cost - Medium Lift 
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Helicopter ACTD). This has created a burdensome array of performance evaluation and 
funding decision criteria. [Ref. 16:pp. 16-17] Some projects are viewed as not mature 
enough. The criticism in these questionably selected programs is that the managers may 
not be afforded the framework within which to manage risks as well as they would in the 
formal process. Concerns exist that this could lead to increases in costs in the long run. 
[Ref. 16:pp. 18-19] 
Despite the AT Office's attempts to address the issue of 
technological maturity, the subject remains problematic. 
Some defense officials argue that developing an explicit 
definition of it is virtually impossible; ACTDs simply 
incorporate too wide a range of technologies. Proponents 
also suggest that since the Breakfast Club is coinposed of 
officials who are well seasoned in defense acquisition, it 
possesses enough expertise to assess the technical maturity 
of candidate projects. [Ref. 16:p. 21] 
3. Comparison of ACTDs to the Traditional Acquisition Process 
Any comparison of the ACTD process to that of the traditional formal acquisition 
process must be prefaced with the acknowledgement that, as stated before, the ACTD· 
program is not a substitute for the traditional procurement process. "The existing process 
will still be needed for major equipment items such as ships and aircraft." [Ref 26:p. 2] 
The ACTD process is designed to be a pre-acquisition activity that allows the user 
to operate and assess the military utility of a prototype before a decision to acquire takes 
place. [Ref. 66:p. 1] This is done in ACTDs with less money committed up-front than in 
traditional procurements. [Ref. 63] The procurement of additional units or capability 
beyond the ACTD residuals, where appropriate, will still be accomplished through the 
formal acquisition process. [Ref. 62] The demonstration of military utility and technical 
capability in advance of the acquisition decision ,assists ACTD program managers in 
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detennining which is the appropriate phase to enter in transitioning the ACTD to the 
fonnal acquisition process. The ACTD program can enter the fonnal acquisition process 
as far downstream as Milestone III, as opposed to the traditional entry point of Milestone 
O. [Ref. 3 :p. 1] In this way the ACTD can be used to jump-start the traditional 
acquisition process. If the user decides that the capability has significant utility, an 
ACTD may initiate a rapid movement into production within that process. "It can also 
provide insights into the development of doctrine and training, or merely lead to new 
ideas." [Ref. 26:p. 2] 
Differences can be seen between traditional and ACTD acquisition processes in 
the institution and implementation of acquisition refonn measures. The ACTD programs 
and process are viewed as fundamental core elements in improving our acquisition 
system. [Ref. 43:p. 1] The differences can be seen in the reduction of cycle time, the use 
of teaming arrangements and perfonnance specifications, and the structure of the 
procurement. 
Cycle time reduction methodology is a primary difference that can be established 
as the ACTD can result in a shorter acquisitio!1 cycle. [Ref. 26:p. 2] The ACTD process 
is designed with near tenn responses to military needs as a primary tenet. This tenet 
focuses on acceleration of the evaluation process that reduces cycle time compared to the 
fonnal acquisition process. [Ref. 33:p. 1] 
The medium altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle 
ACTD enabled the development of Predator from an 
operational concept to an operational system in only 30 
months. This brand of advanced technology enables the 
acquisition process to begin at Milestone II rather than 
Milestone zero. [Ref. 26:p. 2] 
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Teaming between the user and developer and establishment of the IPPD process 
are mandated elements of ACTDs while existing as recommended elements of the 
traditional acquisition process. [Ref. 33:p. 1] 
ACTDs are taking full advantage of the integrated product 
and process development approach that I described a few 
weeks ago - currently used in the Department - and also 
used by commercial industry to ensure shorter cycle times, 
lower cost, and more rapid delivery to the customer. [Ref. 
43:p. 1] 
The use of perfo~ance specifications assessed by military utility is the basic 
premise of ACTDs, ,which characterize system performance not requirements. "You can 
write requirements into the plan but do so at the risk of approaching traditional 
acquisition process." [Ref. 52] ACTDs, like the traditional acquisition process, involve 
some testing of the equipment but the end user military utility assessment is the defining 
test, not an Operation Test and Assessment (OT&A). [Ref. 63] 
The structure of the ACTD acquisition process involved considerable 
management oversight but each ACTD program is highly tailored and generally involves 
less formal structure than traditional acquisitions. This is due, in part, to the fact that 
formal acquisitions typically involve programs with higher funding levels and are 
"governed by laws and regulations which have to be addressed by major defense system 
acquisition programs". [Ref. 61 :p. 1] 
Considering the various mechanisms and approaches used 
by the Government-industry team to manage and control 
the Predator ACTD, we need to emphasize that an ACTD is 
not a major acquisition program, as are, for example, the F-
22, FIA-18EIF, and RAH-66A. Rather, it is more similar to 
a research and development effort for demonstrating a 
capability to operational users. [Ref. 77:pp. 30-31] 
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The difference in acquisition process structure is also reflected in the recording 
and reporting requirements involved in the ACTD process. 
An example that highlights the stark difference between the 
two processes is that the Predator ACTD utilized minimal 
supportability documentation, whereas a typical formal 
acquisition program tends to require a significant amount of 
supportability data and reference documents. [Ref. 77:p. 
31] 
Another difference that can be found in comparing the ACTD and traditional 
acquisition processes is fo~d in the development of the ORD. While both allow for the 
continuous development of the ORD the ACTD process does not concentrate on a highly 
intensive up-front effort as seen in traditional acquisitions. The concentration for an 
ACTD lies in the developmeJ;1t of an ORD throughout the process that "reflects the 
capability of the prototype". [Ref. 29] The ACTD process is designed to provide 
capability now, via the prototype, while planning for future changes and improvements 
with the advent of technology development. The development of the ORD is geared to 
reflect that design. [Ref. 63] 
A final difference in the comparison involves the formal planning for 
supportability of the acquisition. Residuals of ACTDs include the provision for support 
for a period of only two years. Further supportability issues are addressed in the event of 
transition. [Ref. 35:p. A35] 
Formal acquisition programs are required to determine 
supportability plans, conduct logistics support analysis 
(LSA) tasks, and perform life-cycle cost estimates; ACTD 
programs are not. This was evident in the Predator ACTD 
as well. The fast pace and relatively short schedule of the 
ACTD process made it difficult to adequately determine 
long-term logistics requirements. Similarly, the primary 
focus of the ACTD was on the demonstration of 
technology-and the technical performance of the system-
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and not on how supportable or maintainable the system 
was. The determination of Predator's military utility by 
USACOM had virtually nothing to do with logistics or 
LCC issues. [Re,f. 77:p. 45] 
E. CHAPTER II SUMMARY 
Chapter II of this study provides an introduction to the traditional formal 
acquisition process and its relative advantages and disadvantages. The formal acquisition 
process begins with an evaluation of needs in the context of a Service or Agency's 
mission, available resources and current priorities. The process that follows is a series of 
Milestones and Phases that are established to provide oversight, evaluation, and 
development of the initial need as the program matures. The end process of the 
development is an established set of performance requirements. The final stages in the 
process involve the use of those established requirements in the physical development (to 
include Low Rate Initial Production as applicable), production, support and disposal of 
the item. 
Key advantages of the traditional acquisition process are discussed. These 
advantages include familiarity with the process, established review, oversight and control 
measures, and the ability to tailor the process to best accommodate the acquisition. 
Disadvantages of the traditional process are also discussed. The disadvantages include 
the oversight and review process burden and the risks and cost associated with the length 
of the formal acquisition. 
This chapter also introduces the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
program and its background, process and procedures. ACTDs are described as a joint 
effort between the acquisition and warfighting communities intended to exploit mature 
technologies to rapidly meet military needs. 
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The selection and demonstration process are discussed and compared to the 
formal acquisition process. The management structure and process of the typical ACTD 
are discussed including the staffing and formal ACTD Management Plan. Also discussed 
are the budgeting and transition planning that must be established for each ACTD. If the 
military utility of the capability or system is established and there is a further 
requirement, the ACTD processes will transition into a formal acquisition process. The 
transition will occur as far downstream in the traditional acquisition process as warranted 
by military need, program maturity, and projected risk. Additional differences between 
the formal and ACTD processes were delineated including differences in the 
implementation of acquisition reform measures, development of the ORD, and techniques 
to ensure supportability of the acquisition. 
Chapter III includes a further discussion of the elements of the ACTD process as 
described in this chapter and expresses, in more detail, some of the major issues which 
have arisen in the ACTD process to date. The possible ACID outcomes, testing issues 
and challenges associated with the transition to formal acquisition are examined in light 
of problems that they might create in the ACTD contracting process. 
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III. EXAMINATION OF ACTD OUTCOMES AND TRANSITION ISSUES 
A. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES 
Prior to transition and at the conclusion of the ACTD demonstration phase, a 
decision must be made, relying heavily upon the user's recommendation, on how to 
proceed with the program. The possible outcomes each involve a decision of whether or 
not to transition to production and reflect the result of the determination of military 
utility, the criticality of the need for the capability, the number of systems required. [Ref. 
61 :p. 3] 
1. Transition to Formal Acquisition 
a. Produce Prototype 
When the prototype item or system has been evaluated as militarily 
effective and suitable for use, "the preferred COl,lIse of action is to proceed directly into 
production, probably beginning with LRIP". [Ref. 66:p. 21] Minor modifications could 
be incorporated in the process provided the risks associated are insignificant. [Ref. 66:p.-
21] This outcome results in the opportunity to enter the formal acquisition process 
somewhere closer to Milestone II instead of a Milestone 0 start. [Re£ 43:p. 8] 
b. Produce Prototype Using Pre-Planned Product Development 
Improvement 
The second outcome is most prevalent where the warfighting end-user has 
determined that the prototype item or system is useful but requires specific upgrades to 
improve the military utility. In these cases the program will proceed directly to 
production with the basic configuration of the prototype (with minor modifications if 
45 
necessary). Upgrading of the system will be accomplished using pre-planned product 
improvements (P3I). [Ref. 66:p. 21] 
c. Additional Development Prior to Production 
A third outcome can result when the capability of the prototype item or 
system does not provide suitable military utility, as is, but could prove militarily suitable 
with additional development. In this case there would be fairly significant modification 
expected to make the item or system's capability effective or suitable. Under these 
circumstances the program would most likely enter the formal acquisition process in the 
EMD phase (Phase II). [Ref. 66:p. 21] 
2. No Transition to Formal Acquisition 
a. Need Satisfaction 
In many cases there could be a determination that the concept is not 
suitable for production. This determination may be made, not because the item or system 
was a failure, but because there is no need for any additional items other than the residual 
items. Another determination may be that the concept is not yet ready for large-scale 
development but is satisfactory for current us~ and end-user experimentation. [Ref. 61 :p. 
3] 
h. Termination 
A final outcome that may result after the demonstration phase of an ACTD 
is to merely terminate the program. In these cases the capability is not found to have 
military utility or sufficient potential to justify transitioning the program to formal 
acquisition. [Ref. 66: p. 21] This does not mean, however, that the ACTD would be 
considered a failure. In the case of the Kinetic Energy Boost-Phase Intercept ACTD, the 
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program was assessed as not operationally feasible. The assessment "cost $40 million, 
but prevented the development of a prototype which would have cost $400 million". 
[Ref. 26:p. 2] 
B. TRANSITION ISSUES 
At the conclusion of the demonstration phase the capability is assessed for its 
military utility. The goal of all ACTDs is to demonstrate strong military utility and 
subsequently transition into the formal acquisition process to begin the procurement in 
sufficient quantity to meet the operational requirement. [Ref. 61 :p. 1] 
This transition is not accomplished without proper planning. There are several 
issues that confront the ACTD program in the transition process. 
The primary challenges that are faced in preparing for the 
transition of a ACTD into LRIP are: a) Contracting 
strateg¥-motivating the contractor(s) to proyide a best value 
solution and transitioning into LRIP without loss of 
momentum; b) Interoperability-ensuring that the ACTD can 
interface with other systems on the battlefield; c) 
Supportability-ensuring that the fielded systems will be 
supportable. d) Test and Evaluation-early and continuous 
participation of the operational testing community and 
evaluators throughout the ACTD process from definition of 
data needs and associated military exercises to completion 
of the Operational Assessment to support the 
production/transition decision; e) Affordability-assessing 
affordability and application of a Cost as an Independent 
Variable (CAIV) strategy; f) Funding-choosing the proper 
strategy for obtaining the resources necessary for 
acquisition; g) Requirements-evolving from a mission need 
and associated performance goals at the start of the ACTD 
to a formal ORD and/or a system performance specification 
at the conclusion of the ACTD which captures the 
technology maturity and the knowledge and understanding 
gained by the warfighter while using the capability in 
realistic military exercises; and h) Acquisition Program 
Documentation-defining and planning for the 
documentation required prior to the acquisition decision 
that occurs at the end of the ACTD. [Ref. 61 :p. 1] 
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These issues and the difficulties they pose in the transition to formal acquisition are 
discussed in the following sections and include some significant lessons learned from 
past and current ACTD programs. 
1. Testing And Trial Issues 
To arrive at the previously discussed outcomes, the ACTD program must reach an 
acquisition decision following an exhaustive assessment of military utility by the 
warfighting element of the ACTD team. The military utility is assessed after critical 
examination and evaluation of many factors including suitability, effectiveness, 
interoperability with other systems, and supportability. [Ref. 54] Major elements of the 
ACTD program including the major military utility assessment and testing issues 
impacting the contracting process are discussed below. 
a. Determining Military Utility 
The basic form of an ACTD generally starts from a 
collection of mature technologies or. technology 
demonstration programs which are maturing key 
technologies. The technologies are combined and 
integrated into a complete military capability. The 
objective is to provide decision-makers an opportunity to 
fully understand the operational potential offered by a 
proposed new military capability before making an 
acquisition decision. [Ref. 33:p. 1] 
As discussed in Chapter I, the User-Sponsor provides the warfighter 
perspective and has the responsibility of assessing the capability of the ACTD product 
and determining its military utility. Tom Perdue, the Principal Assistant - Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Advanced Technology), stated that assessing military utility 
requires the following: 
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• Equipping a minimal operational unit to assess unit performance, intra-
unit implications, and the effects on other elements of the force, 
• Developing the Concept of Operation (CONOP) of the demonstration 
(This is the scenario and conditions under which the demonstration will be 
conducted), 
• Evaluating under realistic and meaningful operational conditions, 
• Collecting data on previously defined critical Measures of Performance 
(MOPs), 
• Collecting input from the operators, and 
• Analyzing the results and addressing the military utility elements. [Ref. 
63:Slide 16] 
In a military utility· assessment there ·are three principal elements which . 
must be examined. The first element questions whether the system has the capability to 
do what it is supposed to do. The second element examines whether the capability is 
suitable for use by the operators for which it is intended. And in the third element is an 
assessment of the item or system's relative importance in the overall warfighting 
capability. [Ref. 66:p. 20] 
The warfighter can better address the first two elements by including the 
Test and Evaluation (T &E) community. The involvement of both Development Testing 
and Operational Testing personnel can assist ACTD management establish a set of 
measures of effectiveness, suitability, performance, and critical operational to assess 
military utility. [Ref. 61:p. 16] Operational Test Agencies (OTAs) can provide expertise 
in the planning and assessment of military utility [Ref. 66:p. 21] 
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The requirements described by Perdue are prevalent in the analysis of the 
first two military utility elements. To analyze whether the system does what it is 
supposed to do, the user, in' conjunction with other stakeholders, must detennine just 
what the system should do. Developing the CONOP and assembling an operational unit 
is essential in this analysis. As stated by Michael J. O'Conner, Deputy Director or 
Technology (Missiles, Aviation, Precision Strike) Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Anny for Research, Development and Acquisition, an ACTD "is as 
much about doctrinal issues and CONOPs as it is about technology." [Ref. 57:p. 32] The 
suitability of the system for the forces that will use it can only be accomplished through 
an extensive planning and analysis of its operation under' realistic and relevant 
operational conditions. [Ref.63] 
The assessment of a system's importance in overall warfighting capability 
is the critical element of detennining military utility. This element is vital to subsequent 
funding and acquisition decisions, but does not necessarily require input and participation 
from the T &E community. [Ref. 61 :p. 16] This element is first assessed in the beginning 
of the ACTD process as a key element in the ACTD candidate selection process. One of 
the ACTD Selection Criteria is a requirement that the candidate capability provide "a 
potentially effective response to a priority militaiy need". [Ref. 33:p. 3] The 
determination of need is revisited at various points throughout the ACTD process as it is 
in the fonnal acquisition process. The design of the ACTD process also allows the 
capability to evolve and adapt to changes in threat or technology while assessing the need 
and alternatives throughout the process. [Ref. 33:p. 3] 
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Need establishment is also very important in the acquisition decision 
occurring prior to transition. Initial funding for ACTDs is established only through 
demonstration and two years of residual support. Need establishment thus becomes a 
necessity for the program to obtain additional funding and transition to full production 
and procurement. Before any final contracting action can occur for follow-on 
procurement, the user must show that the system demonstrated "provides a significant 
contribution to our total warfighting capability". [Ref. 66:p. 21] 
h. Testing Plan and Results 
The test and evaluation (T &E) activities within an ACTD 
provide critical inputs to three separate products that are 
developed during the ACTD: a) the assessment of military 
utility performed by the user; b) the operational 
requirements developed by the lead service; and c) the 
Operational Assessment prepared by the Operational Test 
Agency (OTA). [Ref. 61:p. 15] 
As previously discussed, the issue of how well the capability responds to 
the stated military need is best addressed with the input from the T&E community. This 
input should begin in the planning stages of the ACTD. The ACTD Operations Manager 
should involve OT A personnel and utilize ~eir expertise to establish a set of military 
utility measures. This expertise can best be utilized in the structuring of the exercise, 
defining the data required for analysis, and helping to characterize performance of the 
system. [Ref. 61 :p. 16] 
Characterizing the performance entails testing plans the user can employ. 
These plans are used to compile a quantitative performance description and suitability 
measurement for the ACTD configuration. These data create a baseline from which the 
user can assess individual changes in operational requirements in terms of utility, cost, 
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schedule, and risk. The user can also develop an ORD that incorporates a full 
understanding and analysis of the tradeoffs involved. [Ref. 61 :p. 16] Part of the 
information required in creating the ORD is the same data compiled to make the military 
utility assessment and acquisition decision (Acquisition Program Documentation). 
Keeping the documentation to a minimum is key to keep the ACTD on a fast track 
acquisition patp. This requires close coordination between the developers, the user and 
the OTA community. [Ref. 61:p. 20] 
To reach an acquisition decision there must also be an operational 
assessment. Using the characterization of performance described above, the operational 
testers develop the assessment at the same time the requirements are being developed and 
analyzed by the user. This simultaneous development allows the user to see the time, 
cost and acquisition schedule implications of any increase in requirements as they are 
being developed. [Ref. 61:p. 16] 
This gives a complete picture of cost, schedule, and risk 
implications associated with such requirements and allows 
the user to make an informed choice between acquiring a 
capability quickly that is close to the ACTD performance 
level, or requiring a higher performance level and incurring 
the increased cost, schedule and/or risk. Once the user 
completes these tradeoffs and prepares the Operational 
Requirements Document, the operational tester can issue 
the operational assessment against those requirements. 
This assessment will be provided to the acquisition decision 
maker as a formal part of the transition process. [Ref. 61 :p. 
16] 
OTAs can help evaluate the schedule risks imposed by operational requirement changes. 
As excursions are contemplated by the end-user the impact of those excursions can be 
addressed by OTAs for the risk incurred in actually entering the previously intended 
entry point for formal acquisition. [Ref. 61 :p. 20] 
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The T &E community can assist in other ways as· well. While their 
principal role is to get the most realistic environment to the warfighting evaluators, their 
support can go beyond that scope. The support of the OT As can reach into the follow-on 
acquisition. They can assist in the tracking and use of the experimental data as well as 
leverage and monitor contractor testing and evaluation. OT As can also leverage 
technology to reduce test costs. [Ref. 20] 
c. Testing And Trial Issues Lessons Learned 
There have been many lessons learned from ACTDs regarding military 
utility assessment and testing and evaluation. Some of these lessons have already been 
put to use in more recent ACTD programs. F or example, lessons learned from the 
Predator ACTD pointed out the need for a Lead Service to be designated at the start of 
the process to ensure the military utility planning can be conducted properly. [Ref. 77 :1:'. 
57] This recommendation has been incorporated in the ACTD Guidelines. [Ref. 33:p. 3] 
However, many issues from lessons learned have not been overcome and remain a 
problem in the process. The following are some of the major lessons learned, and 
suggestions where applicable, from various ACTD programs: 
Lesson: The customer, or user, will change priorities, is busy and in 
most cases, due to the joint force emphasis of ACTDs, have many components that must 
be coordinated. 
Suggestion: This lesson learned was generated by the Synthetic Theater 
of'War (STOW) ACTD and the solution suggested was to make a concentrated effort to 
include the customers from the outset of the ACTD. The customer(s) should be involved 
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in the establishment of the evaluation plan to help establish the schedule and definition of 
utility. [Ref. 23:Slide 7] 
Lesson: The more customers you have the more problems you 
incur. 
Suggestion: Again the involvement of the customer was stressed with a 
further admonishment to strongly encourage gathering all stakeholders and coordinating 
efforts and agreements early in the ACTD process. [Ref. 61 : Slide 7] 
Lesson: Determine and set "a definite scope for the ACTD to ensure 
the mission can be accomplished. 
Suggestion: Do not allow any last minute, unplanned tests and establish 
a firm "good idea cut-off date". [Ref. 23:Slide 7] 
Lesson: 
scheduled basis. 
Require software deliverables and testing on a regularly 
Suggestion: The contractor will be resistant but the ACTD managers 
must be forceful and ensure this happens to help manage conflicts that will occur among 
development, integration and testing of the software. [Ref. 23:Slide 8] 
Lesson: Exercise or testing dates should be compatible with 
development to avoid delays. 
Suggestion: Use event driven instead of calendar driven schedules as 
much as possible. [Ref. 25] 
Lesson: In developing a CONOP, capture how the warfighter will 
use the system. 
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Suggestion: New tools mean new processes. This requires creative 
thinking and not just automation of old processes. [Ref. 25] 
Lesson: Measures of Effectiveness and Performance (MOEs and 
MOPs) should be made as meaningful as possible. 
Suggestion: Use a healthy mixture of the Technical measurements (e.g. 
Lab results), Objective measurements (e.g. Battle lab results), and Subjective 
measurements (~.g. Warfighter's assessment of how well the system does what it is 
supposed to do). [Ref. 25:S1ide 6] 
Lesson: Success-oriented development schedules do not work. 
Suggestion: Especially in the case of software development, plan for 
time to code, integrate and fix. Slips will happen so plan to use a "Crawl, Walk, Run 
approach". [Ref. 25:S1ide 8] 
Lesson: Analysis and Assessment Teams should display a unity of 
effort. 
Suggestion: The ACTD should have a single analysis team, not two or 
more. [Ref. 54:Slide 8] 
Lesson: The methodology for assessing the military utility should 
be well established. 
Suggestion: The National Defense Research Institute study of the 
Predator ACTD revealed that there were no clear directives on the process to follow in 
assessing military utility. The study suggested that DUSD(AT) and the Joint Staff 
determine a policy and process for assessing utility and the definition of required criteria 
to use in the process. [Ref. 77:pp. 58-59] 
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These lessons learned are not all-inclusive but are intended to highlight the 
major concerns expressed from some of the current and completed ACTD programs. 
Program lessons learned lay the groundwork for future policies. The principal issues 
involved in these lessons are addressed in Chapters IV and V of this thesis in examining 
ACTD contracting methods currently employed and recommendations for future ACTD 
programs. 
2. Transition to Acquisition Issues 
As previously stated, the goal of all ACTDs is to demonstrate military utility and 
transition into the formal acquisition process to begin the procurement in sufficient 
quantity to meet the operational requirement. [Ref. 61 :p. 1] Nearly half of the 46 ACIDs 
that were initiated between 1995 and 1998 are currently expected to transition to 
residuals, meaning that there is no plan to move into the formal acquisition process. [Ref. 
59:p. 5] While the transition only to residuals does not include all the issues associated 
with formal acquisition, it does share many of the same difficult challenges. [Ref. 58] 
The major procurement, funding and supportability issues and lessons learned in ACTD 
transitions to acquisition are discussed below. 
a. Requirements and the Procurement Plan 
The ACTD program is one that is tailored to achieve an end objective and 
not just a demonstration. The management plan is set up to be flexible to help achieve 
that objective, whatever outcome is anticipated. Two major components of an ACTD 
Management Plan are the system requirements and procurement/contracting plans. [Ref. 
29, Slide 4] Team coordination is vital to the completion of these components as the 
ACTD Technology Manager (designated by the Lead Service) leads the Acquisition 
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Strategy Working IPT (WIPT) "while the User-Sponsor leads the Requirements WIPT. 
[Ref. 29, Slide 5] The Lead Service has the responsibility of developing and fmalizing 
the ORD. [Ref. 63:Slide 17] 
The requirements for a transitioning ACTD program's system should be 
defined in the ORD. [Ref. 61:p. 19] The ORD should incorporate any cost/performance 
trade-offs that were made in the process. [Ref. 63] As the ORD is developed there should 
also be a concurrent system performance specification constructed. A final system 
performance specification can then be generated that can be used as a functional 
configuration baseline ~o begin the follow-on procurement and production efforts. [Ref. 
61:p. 19] Following a system's successful showing of military utility, the baseline that 
develops should reflect the capability of the prototype. [Ref. 29, Slide 6] Since ACTDs 
characterize system' performance instead of working off established requirements, the 
final requirement and procurement plan cannot be set until the ACTD is complete. [Ref. 
52] 
The Procurement (or Contracting) Plan for an ACTD is tailored to the 
particular circumstances associated with that ACTD. The procurement strategy should 
include both ACTD and post-ACTD objectives and remain flexible to adjust to 
circumstances that may cause a deviation from the original objective. [Ref. 61 :p. 12] 
The strategy should also incorporate competition early in the process and continue to use 
the influence of competition throughout the program's existence. One way this is being 
done is to conduct a competition at the start of the process and retain multiple contractors 
in the early phases of the program. [Ref. 66:p. 19] 
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Any contracting strategy should address how DoD would procure further 
units of a system if that becomes DoD's decision at the conclusion of the ACID. The 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) recommended three contracting strategies that 
may be employed to deal with such eventualities. [Ref. 61 :p. 12] 
The first recommended approach is to obtain priced options for production 
of additional units up front when the competitive offers are being solicited. These 
options should include Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Defense FAR 
Supplement required terms and conditions. The cOIiditions of the options would have to 
be clearly defined in the ACTD Management Plan and solicitation for bids. Priced 
options are best applied when the technology at issue is significantly mature and there is 
little expectation of design changes. However, the onus is on DoD to determine the 
maturity level of the technology so that the risks placed on the contractors are not 
unreasonable. [Ref. 61 :p. 12] 
The contracting method of priced options presents several advantages and 
disadvantages. One advantage of this method is that the process is competitive in nature 
versus a negotiated settlement conducted ~her in the ACTD process. Another 
advantage is the reduction in procurement lead-time and avoidance of disruption in the 
procurement process. [Ref. 61:p. 12] The disadvantages of the priced option include the 
possibility of placing too high a production cost risk burden on contractors. This could 
result in lessened competition or possible default further into the process. Another 
disadvantage is the limitation of the method to only those ACTDs with extremely mature 
technology to demonstrate. [Ref. 12] 
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The second method recommended by OSD is to solicit non-binding 
information from contractors on future production pricing. DoD could then use this 
information to analyze the issue of affordability in the source selection phase. This is 
seen as a more viable contracting method when the system is more likely to incur some 
design or configuration changes. The solicitation would state that future contracts for 
production would be conditioned on the contractor proposing prices that are equal to or 
less than those initially provided. This method presents the same opportunity to receive 
the benefits of competitive bids that the priced option afforded but would still require the 
Government contracting officer to obtain proposals and negotiate prices. OSD contends 
that this method would take more time and effort than exercising an option but would be 
less burdensome than negotiation a typical sole source contract. [Ref. 61:p. 12] 
The final contracting option recommended by OSD involves the occasions 
when the ACTD program is to enter a development program at the conclusion of the 
ACTD. The program may arrive at this juncture either by design from the outset of the 
program or after the ACTD resulted in a conclusion that further development was 
required. The option at this point is to either contract sole source with the ACTD 
contractor or to compete the development program. OSD does not advocate one over the 
other but recommends the following matters be considered in the decision making 
process. Contracting Officers should consider whether competition exists, the size of the 
development effort, the cost and quantity of systems to be procured, the degree of 
soundness of the design of the ACTD system, and whether DoD owns the ACTD data, 
design or hardware property rights. OSD guidance suggests the competition option when 
the need for significantly changed designs or a new system is required. This is 
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recommended since the pricing obtained from the ACTD would be invalid and a sole 
source justification would not exist. [Ref. 61 :p. 12] 
The objective of contracting for ACTDs is to get capable systems to the 
operational users quickly while emphasizing affordability at every step of the process. 
The challenges exist in shortening procurement lead-time, translating objective 
requirements into contract specifications, planning for transition and· incentivizing 
affordability in the contract. [Ref. 11] 
The challenge to reduce procurement lead-time is part of an overall 
mandate to reduce cy~le time for procurement in DoD. [Ref. 46:p. 79] Whether in 
ACTDs or the traditional acquisition process, where cycle time can be driven down, cost 
and quality will improve. "So the bottom line is that time is a precious commodity and 
has value - it is true every time a new product arrives in advance of the competition." 
[Ref. 13:p. 176] 
The ACTD contracting challenges related to requirements production have· 
been discussed earlier in this chapter, however some recommendations have been made 
regarding this issue. The importance of teaming in the development of the requirements 
is critical to establishing an ORD. Teaming keeps the principal stakeholders informed 
and involved as the requirements change. This allows early planning and collaboration 
among the CINC Sponsor, the contractor, the acquirer, OTAs and other users, in joint 
endeavors. [Ref. 29] Another recommendation is to thoroughly document changes made 
to the requirement at every step of the process. Also at issue are the trade-offs of cost 
and time for performance. These trade-offs can delay final requirements formulation and 
thus impact the contracting for production of the sYlltem. [Ref. 11] 
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Transition planning, especially in the contracting phase, is vital to 
maintain momentum in the ACTD program's progress. [Ref. 11] It has been suggested 
that this planning can be best accomplished with the addition of a Transition Manager to 
the ACTD management structure. The downside of this recommendation is the cost in 
money and manpower for such a role to be filled. But as stated by Arthur L. Money, 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), "ACTDs must have a Transition 
Manager from the get-go - and to those who say you can't afford it, I say you can't 
afford not to do it." [Ref. 53] 
The final challenge mentioned is the issue of affordability. The 
contracting officer must address affordability early and often in the process. If the 
affordability is a barrier to acquisition this should be addressed in the ACTD solicitation. 
Cost drivers should be identified and attacked in the ACTD formation (alternate 
concepts), the contract itself (unit price objectives or affordability incentives), the design 
(allowing CAIV -based trade-offs), and in the utility assessment (cost effectiveness. of 
system capability options). [Ref. 29, Slide8] 
The ACTD transition issues of contracting, especially in the area of 
affordability, and requirements definition are moot if the funding of the ACID is not 
accomplished. This vital element of any acquisition program is discussed below. 
h. Supportability and Funding 
Supportability issues pertain to the contemplation and planning of logistics 
and training support for the ACTD through the tests and residual capability period. There 
may be considerable funding set aside for supportability. The items delineated include 
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contractor support/spares, safety, transportation and environmental concerns. [Ref. 61 :p. 
14] 
The principal issues revolve around the outcome of the acquisition 
decision. As previously discussed ACTD residuals are funded, including support, for a 
period of two years following the completion of the ACTD. If the goal or expected 
outcome of an ACTD is for only the residual, the contracting of Contractor Logistic 
Support (CLS) would save work efforts in the area of training documentation and 
development. Another supportability issue is the design configuration for the system and 
its compatibility with existing systems. By contracting for similar design and 
compatibility DoD can streamline maintenance and operational training, saving time and 
cost in the process. [Ref. 61:p. 14] Careful planning in the area of supportability should 
target "affordability gains" for future systems, reflect maintenance and design tradeoffs, 
and introduce required supportability "estimation methods into the acquisition process 
while incorporating personnel-related considerations". [Ref. 60:Sect. 3.2.3.2] 
There are many issues regarding the funding aspects of ACTDs. The 
central issue here is the amount and timing of funds available for the ACID and any 
follow-on acquisitions. Funding considerations are quite evident early in the ACTD 
process. Before an ACTD candidate can be selected there must be sufficient funding 
available to conduct the demonstration and provide technical support for the first two 
years after fielding the system. [Ref. 33:p. 4] However, for selection to occur there does 
not have to be a commitment for out-year funding beyond the residual phase. [Ref. 52, 
Slide 14] Even when there is dedicated funding there is no guarantee that the funding 
will stay in place for the duration. Mr. Larry Lynn, the Director of Advanced Research 
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Project Agency in 1995, noted, "It's a commitment. Of course there is no such thing as 
an irrevocable commitment, but to the extent you can, it is an agreement by all the 
players." [Ref. 43:p. 10] One recommendation to gaining and maintaining these funds is 
to "market" the ACTD continually. By keeping stakeholders up-to-date, scheduling 
periodic events and publicizing the results, the project remains viable for funding. [Ref. 
23 :Slide 9] There could still be problems though, especially in this period of highly 
restricted defense budgets where the joint endeavors pose a significant problem. If in the 
development of th~ project, one or more of the Services decides to back out, this could 
leave the program requiring full support from the remaining Service(s). This was the 
case in the Counterproliferation I ACTD where the lead Service backed out and the 
remaining Service was without adequate funding. The result was a significant reduction 
in the scale of the ACTD program. [Ref. 9] 
The central funding issue involves the planning for stable funding 
throughout the ACTD including the transition to production. Remember that the goal of 
an ACTD is getting a needed capability to the warfighter in rapid fashion that can result 
in both time and cost savings. The notion of. speeding technology to the warfighter is 
hampered however by resource and budget constraints. The primary constraint is the 
inability to perform the timely programming of funds during the appropriate Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle. [Ref. 61 :p. 16] The typical POM schedule is 
planned two years in advance. The most ambitious ACTDs can miss a POM cutoff for 
out year funding at its inception. [Ref. 28] 
The compressed schedules of ACTDs also mean that there is little time 
existing for work -arounds and any unstable funding could create delays by disrupting 
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ACTD progress. In a worst case scenario these delays and disruptions could cause a lack 
of interest and support for the program. ACTD programs must stay on schedule to meet 
their objectives and remain viable. [Ref. 77:p. 59] 
As discussed in Chapter II, RDT &E funding for ACTDs currently come 
from two sources: 1) Lead Military Departments/Agencies who supply the underlying 
technology fun~ing provide the bulk of the funding, and 2) OSD can supplement the 
Service/Agency funding to help cover ACTD integration expenses and residual capability 
technical support. [Ref. 7] Through the 1995-1998 period an average of $800 million 
per year has been spent on ACTDs. Only a small portion of those funds ($77 million in 
1998) were provided by the DUSD(AT). [Ref. 59:p. 8] Funding is to be reviewed 
annually by the joint managers who will submit reports and recommendations to the 
Oversight Panel for review and concurrence. [Ref. 34:p. A22] 
The type of funds used to support the ACTD prograins are varied. 
Depending on the Agency or Service's interpretation of the maturity level of the 
technology the funding may be provided from different budget categories within each 
Agency or Service's budget. [R~f. 16:p. 17] 
For example, officials in the Army's science and 
technology community consider a project mature only if it 
can be readily put in the field. Their Navy and Air Force 
counterparts take a more flexible approach, citing as mature 
any technology currently in an Advanced Technology 
Development program (part' of budget category 6.3) or 
lying outside the very early phases of the research and 
development (R&D) process. (DoD categorizes R&D 
funding as 6.1 through 6.7 to signify whether the work is 
closer to understanding underlying science [6.1], well down 
the road toward engineering a new piece of equipment 
[6.4], or modifying systems that are already being operated 
in the field [6.7].) Most sources of funding for ACTDs fall 
under categories 6.3 and 6.4; however, much of Defense 
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Advanced research Projects Agency's early funding for 
ACTDs selected in 1996 fell under budget category 6.2, 
applied research. Until recently, the services have 
occasionally contributed a small amount of 6.2 funding 
toward certain projects. [Ref. 16:p. 20] 
To help address many funding issues, OSD has created a Road Map for 
ACTD Transition funding. This "Road Map" states that the "Lead Service will, at the 
appropriate time, define and establish a funding methodology for effective insertion of 
the ACTD follow-on acquisition into the resource allocation process". [Ref. 61 :p. 18] 
For the initial funding the DUSD(AT) will approve funding provided by OSD and will 
appoint the Technology Manager as the individual responsible for the execution of all 
funds associated with the ACTD. [Ref. 61:p. 18] 
OSD also recommended three methods for the funding of follow-on 
acquisitions given differing ACTD ·planned objectives ~d outcomes. . These fundiI?-g 
situations and recommendations are listed below: 
1. High Military Utility-No Resources Programmed -
Decrement Another Program(s). 
When an ACTD is judged to provide significant 
enhancement in military capability and no resources have 
been provided to support the effort, the follow-on funding 
issue Gan be presented to the Defense Resource Board 
(DRB) or Enhanced Defense Resource Board (ERDB) for 
discussion and resolution. The funding request would ask 
the DRB or EDRB (for intelligence programs) for funding 
to support the follow-on to the ACTD. Ongoing programs 
will have to be decremented in order to provide the 
necessary funding to support the ACTD. This type of 
funding strategy should be used when the "urgency of 
need" warrants rapid acquisition and overrides the formal 
PPBS cycle. 
2. Military Utility Established-No Resources Programmed 
- Programming Resources Causes Two-Year Delay. 
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The Lead Service programs for resources at the end of the 
ACTD, assuming that military utility has been 
demonstrated. This alternative results in funds becoming 
available two years after completion of the ACTD. In the 
interim, the residual capability from the ACTD that was left 
with the user will provide a limited operational capability. 
However, this means that the continuity from an ACTD to 
an acquisition program may be broken, and momentum 
lost. 
3. Assume Success For Some ACTDs-Program Resources 
In Anticipation Of Follow-On Acquisition. 
One way to avoid or at least minimize the break in 
continuity between an ACTD and the follow-on acquisition 
program is for the Lead Service to establish, at some point 
during the ACTD, a budget line with funding, dedicated 
solely to acquisition of the ACTD. This approach would be 
best suited to an ACTD for which the military utility is 
expected to be high, and where there are early indications 
that the expectations will be met. If it is possible to 
establish this budget line two years prior to the anticipated 
decision point to enter development or LRIP, the break in 
continuity may be avoided altogether. This funding 
strategy, of establishing early ACTD specific funding in. a 
RDT &E or procurement line, provides the transition 
funding bridge to support the follow-on acquisition. If the 
program becomes a joint program, the Lead Service can 
transfer the appropriate resources to the designated Joint 
Program Lead Service for execution. The funding 
approach will also contribute to overall defense program 
stability, not having to decrement ongoing programs to 
"find" necessary resources. [Ref. 61 :pp. 18-19] 
The Army has already instituted a program that utilizes the ideas and 
advantages of the third OSD recommendation. The Army has set aside a portion of the 
yearly service budget to support the Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). 
[Ref. 7] Under the directive of the Army all HQDA staff, staff agencies, and material 
commands are to participate and support WRAP, as appropriate. [Ref. 5:Sect. 1-4] 
WRAP is directed at accelerating procurement of systems 
identified through Army Training and Doctrine Command 
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(TRADOC) warfighting experiments (AWEs), concept 
evaluation programs (CEPs), advanced technology 
demonstrations (ATDs), advanced concept technology 
demonstrations (ACTDs), and similar experiments where a 
TRADOC Integrated Concept Team supported by a 
TRADOC battle lab are directly involved. The review 
forum used to review these systems is the WRAP Army 
Systems Acquisition Review Council. [Ref. 5:Sect. 1-4] 
c. Transition to Acquisition Issues Lessons Learned 
There have been numerous lessons learned in the transitioning of ACTDs 
to formal acquisition. While the issues raised in the preceding sections have touched on 
some lessons learned, the following list of lessons learned will highlight the major issues 
and recommendations of the various Services and Agencies: 
Lesson: Address supportability in the design of the prototype. 
Suggestion: Supportability can be affected by the prototype design. But 
the need for some supportability of the system may also have an effect on the design 
(e.g., Needs to be transported by a C-141) and therefore require up-front communication 
to industry.) [Ref. 29, Slide 11] 
Lesson: Some supportability items are not required for a 
demonstration and can be deferred until the transition to residuals or possibly until full 
production. [Ref. 29, Slide 11] 
Suggestion: Clearly express to industry via the Request for Proposal 
(RFP) the goal of transition (e.g., into LRIP) and ask the bidders to express their plan to 
ensure supportability at each phase. [Ref. 66:p. 20] Collect supportability data throughout 
the process and include an ILS option to prepare for supportability items that can be 
deferred. [Ref. 29, Slide 11] 
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Lesson: Create and foster strong competitive pressures in the areas 
of cost, schedule, and technical performance throughout the ACTD program. 
Suggestion: Hold a major competition at the start of the ACTD. In 
these cases the cost risk is lower and the program needs to keep momentum. [Ref 29, 
Slide 10] Do not down-select too soon in the design phase to preserve competition and 
keep affordability goals viable. [Ref 1] Keeping competition in the program is difficult. 
After going sole source, the Predator ACTD contracting officers attempted to incorporate 
competition and were not successful. [Ref. 64] 
Lesson: Industry has shown that they can make trades in their 
design that result in life cycle.cost reductions for DoD later. 
Suggestion: The key is to "build in life cycle costs as an evaluation 
factor". [Ref. 1] 
Lesson: Use the competitive influence created at the start to your 
advantage in planning the potential follow-on acguisition. 
Suggestion: Make use of options or unit price thresholds to keep costs 
down. Stress the retention of military utility as a major pre-requisite for follow-on 
acquisition to ensure technical performance levels. Incentivize and stress the importance 
of cycle time to keep to tight schedules. [Ref. 29, Slide 10] 
Lesson: Develop and communicate your contracting strategy clearly 
to industry as early as possible. 
Suggestion: Early communication will afford industry the opportunity 
to judge the risks and rewards to make more informed investment decisions. [Ref. 66:p. 
19] 
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Lesson: Stable funding is a key to maintaining the momentum of 
the ACTD. 
Suggestion: Future ACTDs should seek to maintain funding stability 
throughout the life of the ACTD. [Ref. 77:p. 59] The ACTD should be "marketed" 
continually to ensure the viability of the program is broadcast to the appropriate 
stakeholders. [Ref. 23:Slide 9] 
Lesson: Early transition planning is a key to success. 
Suggestion: Ensure that the stakeholders, especially the Lead Service, 
are committed to prepare for transition and follow through with the plan. The Lead 
Service must prepare for the acquisition decision, develop and finalize the ORD, and 
prepare for and support the appropriate milestone decision [Ref. 63:Slide 17] 
Again, these lessons learned are not all-inclusive but are intended to 
highlight the major transition issues involved in current and completed ACTD programs. 
Principal issues discussed in these lessons learned are addressed later in this thesis in 
examining ACTD contracting methods currently employed and recommendations for 
future ACTD programs. 
C. CHAPTER III SUMMARY 
Chapter III of this study provides an introduction to and explanation of the 
possible outcomes that can result from an ACTD. After a showing of military utility the 
ACTDs can transition to full production and take the form of a formal acquisition. This 
transition can occur with no changes to the prototype design, limited changes to the 
prototype design, or after further development of the concept or system. Not all ACTDs 
transition to full production. Some ACTDs have proven military utility and are sufficient 
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in quality and quantity as presented from the demonstration. Others may prove to have 
military utility but there may be no priority military requirement for the capability 
demonstrated. A final outcome that may result is that the ACTD showed no military 
utility. In these cases the ACTD program is simply terminated. 
Chapter III also examines the major issues involved in the transition of ACTDs to 
production. T~e discussion is broken into issues involved in testing and trial of the 
ACTD to determine military utility and the transition supportability and procurement 
issues. Military utility issues includes an examination of the principal players involved in 
the evaluation and the three principal questions that must be satisfied for any ACTD 
program: Does the system do what it is intended to do? Is the system suitable for use by 
the intended user? Does the system provide capability that satisfies a priority need of the 
military? 
Testing and Trial issues are examined and the major players and their respective 
roles and responsibilities are identified. The principal players in the process are the 
warfighters who will actually conduct the ACTD and assess its ability to meet the needs 
of the military. Also discussed are the OTAs and their capability to assist ACTD 
managers and oversight· groups throughout the process. The major issues of ACID 
testing and trials are discussed including critical role trade-offs play and their effect on 
costs, schedule and performance. Lessons learned from various ACTD sources were 
included to highlight the issues discussed and provide points of data for analysis in the 
contracting for ACTDs currently and in the future. 
Major issues involving the transition of ACTDs to formal acquisition are 
examined in the critical areas of requirement definition and the procurement plan. Before 
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any ACID can successfully transition to and enter the formal acquisition process the 
requirements must be defined. Getting to that final determination can take many routes 
and pose problems for a contracting officer in the planning for transition. Also facing a 
Government contracting officer are a myriad of issues which call for the anticipation of 
and planning for the outcome of an ACID. Discussed are the issues faced in dealing 
with the purchase of an ACID while maintaining competition advantages and an 
uncertain funding situation .. Ihe primary methods of contracting discussed were the use 
of options, the inclusion of non-binding price quotes that could be used for evaluation 
and deferred sole-source contract and fmally the competing out option at the end of an 
ACID. 
Funding and supportability issues are also examined. The principal methods of 
planning for a smooth transition are discussed. One method discussed was to insert a 
budget wedge in anticipation of successful ACIDs. A second method requires the 
prioritizing of requirements and making use of available funds to the decrement of 
current programs. Ihe third follow-on procurement budget method was to seek and 
program funds after a showing of military utility~ recognizing the two-year lag time that 
exists using this method. Chapter III concludes with another list of lessons learned from 
current and former ACIDs regarding transition to acquisition issues. 
Chapter IV further explores the Classes of ACIDs. Various examples of each 
class of ACID are used to further explain the differences between the classes. Ihe 
ACID examples are also examined to determine the contracting methods employed to 
contract for the ACID and, where applicable, the transition to full production. The 
contracting methods are analyzed for their relative effectiveness, success or failure. 
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Other contracting methods are examined as well with some analysis regarding their 
potential applicability for use in each class. 
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IV. CONTRACTING METHODOLOGY IN ACTD CLASSES 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, to aid in the organization and 
management of ACTDs, established and defined three classes of ACTDs. [Ref. 77:p. 15] 
Chapter IV provides a detailed analysis of the three classes of ACTDs, which are divided, 
based on the type of technology they engage and the intended long-term direction of the 
program. [Ref. 16:p. 12] Specific examples of ACTDs are given for each of the three 
classes. The specific examples, with the exception of the High Altitude Endurance UAV, 
are the ACTDs that have, as of September 1998, completed the demonstration phase of 
their respective programs. Each example is described with an emphasis on the 
distinguishing characteristics of the specific program. Following the description of each 
class and example ACTDs, an analysis is conducted of the various contracting methods 
that have been, are being, or could be used in the class. The analysis includes an 
examination of why certain methods were used in various contracts as well as an 
evaluation of the methods' effectiveness in addressing program risks and goals. 
The method of data collection for the following discussion included personal and 
phone interviews of key personnel involved in completed and current programs to 
ascertain further insight into ACTD processes, challenges, and lessons learned. 
Interviews were conducted with a variety of individuals that principally included 
DUSD(AT) Staff, Service and Agency Contract Managers, and individual programs' 
Operational and Technology (formerly Demonstration) Managers. The interviewees 
were given the option to express their observations and opinions on a non-attribution 
basis to allow for a more informative critique of ongoing programs. Appendix B 
provides initial points of contact from which the researcher received much of the 
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information that follows. Appendix C is a table that lists the results of a survey 
conducted by the researcher to determine the contracting strategies and contract types 
employed by the various ACTD programs. 
A. CLASS I ACTDS 
1. Description of Class I ACTDs 
Class 1 ACTDs are described by the DUSD(AT) as typically being "information 
systems with special purpose software operating on coinmercial workstations" [Ref. 61 :p. 
6] Generally, Class I ACTDs involve systems that are required in small quantities and 
often the military need can be filled with little or no further development or production 
required. The post-ACTD phase will typically include only residual assets produced 
during the demonstration program. [Ref. 34:p. A32] 
2. Representative Class I ACTDs 
Completed Class 1 ACTDs include the Advanced Joint Planning ACTD and the 
Synthetic Theater of War ACTD. 
a. Advanced Joint Planning (AJP) ACTD 
(1) Description. Completed in early 1998, the Advanced Joint 
Planning ACTD developed and demonstrated the capability "to integrate, organize, 
analyze and present joint readiness data for all CONUS based forces". [Ref. 2:p. 1-4] The 
ACTD, instead of developing new technologies, sought to exploit a variety of existing 
information-based services. These services were to be used to improve operational 
planning capabilities by including the most capable and useful technology for Battle Staff 
Command and Control (C2). The goal of the technology integration and development is 
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to allow U.S. Forces to quickly assess total force readiness and to coordinate force 
deployment within a collaborative environment. [Ref. 4:pp. 1,8] 
The AJP ACTD program is supported by the User-Sponsor, the 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM) as well as the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and DARPAIDefense Infonnation 
Systems Agency (DISA) Joint Program Office. DARPA is the lead development agency 
and the executive agent for daily management of this ACTD. [Ref. 4:pp. 1,9] 
(2) Contracting Methods Employed. According to program 
executives, one of the goals of the program was to exploit a variety of existing 
infonnation-based services instead of developing new technology. In furtherance of that 
goal the managers of the AJP ACTD used pre-existing contract vehicles to supply the 
system software required. for the ACTD. Some new system integration software was 
contracted for by extending existing software development contracts. The contracts that 
were already in place were predominately Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contracts. A 
CPFF contract is a cost reimbursable contract that pays to the contractor cos~s and a 
negotiated fee that is established at the beginning of the contract. 1 The extension of the 
AJP ACTD contracts did, in some cases, include adjusted fee amounts. 
Research revealed that the AJP ACTD was not planned to 
transition to fonnal acquisition. Residua~ capability was planned to be transitioned 
through DISA into the Global Command and Control System cores services. 
1 Research revealed that the AJP ACTD was not planned to tranSItIOn to fonnal 
acquisition. Residual capability was planned to be transitioned through DISA into the 
Global Command and Control System cores services. 
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b. Synthetic Theater o/War ACTD 
(1) Description. The Synthetic Theater of War (STOW) 
ACTD goal is to demonstrate, under operational conditions, Advanced Distributed 
Simulation (ADS) technologies that will serve to support joint training and mission 
rehearsal. This program is an attempt to use technology to adapt to new military strategy 
that emphasizes,coordination of joint military crisis response. The program also seeks to 
find the most cost-effective methods to conduct joint military training and demonstrate 
how a simulated battlespace can be employed in a myriad of joint missions. [Ref. 76:p. 1] 
The STOW ACTD has thus far been successful in demonstrating 
and evaluating the capabilities of ADS technology to improve joint training and mission 
rehearsal. 
Specific objectives achieved in Unified Endeavor 98-1, a 
Joint Task Force level exercise in October 1997, included a 
demonstration of enhanced simulation fidelity based on 
combat resolution at the weapons system level; realistic 
simulation of command and control behavior; networking 
and infonnation flow technology; and the capability to 
provide knowledge-based autonomous forces in simulation 
with man-in-the-Ioop participation wherever desired. The 
system supported up to 8,000 entities illustrating a new 
milestone in simulation scalability. The combination of 
STOW's successes with C4I, environniental, knowledge-
based force integration, and the common data infrastructure 
demonstrates a significant potential for using simulation 
with lower cost and greater efficiency in the training, 
mission rehearsal and analysis required by Joint 
Vision 2010. [Ref. 2:p. 1-5] 
Like the AJP ACTD previously discussed, CINCUSACOM is the 
User-Sponsor and DARPA is serving as the primary developer for the STOW ACTD. 
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(2) Contracting Methods Employed. The STOW ACTD 
consisted of several components. The main component was the System Engineering, 
Integration, and Demonstration (SEID) which would call for a contractor to act as the 
Lead Integrator for the system demonstration. According to a program manager, this 
portion of the ACTD program involved solicitation via a Request For Proposal (RFPY 
and resulted in a highly competitive traditional acquisition process with multiple awards. 
The candidates' proposals were reviewed with an emphasis on risk management and 
resulted in the selection of two integrators. One contractor involved proved superior and 
eventually received an increased role in the program. Both contractors were operating 
under a CPFF contract. 
The Synthetic Environment development portions of the program 
were sole sourced to a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC). 
The decision to use a sole source commitment in this case was to allow for sufficient 
Government oversight on a project with a short lead-time. 
The remaining software ~ontracts were solicited via a Broad 
Agency Announcement (BAA). 3 This provided a great deal of competition and resulted 
in CPFF contracts for contractors submitting successful proposals. 
The STOW ACTD was not intended to transition to formal 
acquisition. Based on results from the final data assessment in May 1998, STOW 
2 The solicitation methods in this research will not be explained in depth. For further information and 
explanation of these methods please consult the Federal Acquisition Regulation Parts 14 and 35. 
3 A BAA is an announcement of a federal agency's general research interests which invites proposals and 
specifies the potential award's general terms and conditions. More information on BAAs and their 
application can be found in FAR Part 35.016. 
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residuals are transitioning to the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) and Service simulation 
systems. 
3. Analysis of Contracting Methods Employed in Class I ACTDs 
The two representative ACTD programs chose to use CPFF contracts as their 
principal contract type. Sources from both programs commented that these ACTDs are 
R&D in nature and that there is a necessity for some type of cost· reimbursable 
arrangement. The uncertainties in the estimates of total cost in software development 
generally preclude the use of any type of fixed price contract vehicle. Provided there is 
sufficient oversight and cost determination systems in place the cost-plus methods are 
preferable. 
According to one Contract Manager, the use of a CPFF contract was a mistake. It 
was a perceived lack of control over the contractor that caused the concern. The program 
found it difficult to keep the contractor's attention on cost and the focus of the 
development. The developer was late in producing contract "deliverables" and took . 
some seemingly needless direction with the program software. The Contract Manager 
felt that some incentive should be included in the contract to keep the contractor focused. 
The recommended contract type given by the contract manager was a Cost-Plus-
Incentive-Fee (CPIF) contract. In a CPIF contract the target cost, a target fee, minimum 
and maximum fees, and a fee adjustment formula are negotiated between the parties to 
the contract. The Government establishes contract performance objectives. The actual 
amount of fee paid to the contractor is based on the formula and the contractor's 
performance in relation to the objectives that were established. The objectives in this 
type of arrangement are typically related to cost, sc;hedule and/or performance. Where 
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some realistic objectives can be established, the CPIF arrangement could be successful in 
allowing the contracting officer to set the priority for the contractor and provides a way to 
incentivize contractor performance. 
The typical application for this type contract for systems in first run production or 
similar situations where the system is in an advanced stage of development. The 
difficulty in using a CPIF contract in Class I ACTDs is that the development of software 
has proven to be difficult to estimate in terms of schedule and only marginally better in 
terms of cost and performance. For the same reasons it is difficult to enforce scheduled 
deliveries and keep the contractor on focus, it is difficult to develop the finite measures 
required to properly incentivize the contractor under a CPIF contract. 
While no Class I ACTD program was found to use a Fixed Price contract for 
software development, some did utilize Commercial-Off-The-Shelf products in the 
procurement of the system. These buys were primarily to facilitate the overarching 
development and integration of hardware systems. As a primary means of acquisition 
this is not a feasible method as the ACTD process usually involves some new technology 
and development, which will not be satisfied by commercial products. 
One contract type not found in use but that could be successfully implemented in 
Class I ACTDs is Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF). In these contracts there is usually a 
split fee. One part is a fixed, base amount while the second portion is an award amount. 
While the base fee will not vary, the contractor may earn, during the course of contract 
performance, all or part of the award amount. The amount to be awarded is determined 
by the Government's evaluation of the contractor's performance based on the elements of 
criteria expressed in the contract. The criteria that are used to evaluate the contractor can 
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vary from contract to contract and the weight of each criterion may be changed within a 
single contract if the Government deems a shift in incentive emphasis is warranted. A 
decision to award all or part of the fee is a unilateral decision of the Government. 
A CP AF contract can provide a great deal of leverage over the contractor to 
influence a certain performance level sought by the Government. Like a CPIF contract 
there is monetary incentive and emphasis placed on a particular aspect of contractor 
performance. Unlike a CPIF contract this incentive factor can be based on an intangible 
measure. This allows the Government contracting officer to incentivize performance in 
situations, like software development, where the technical development of a system is not 
significantly advanced. The .use of a CP AF contract would best be applied where the 
mission is well defined but the performance measures are not. In these cases the program 
managers can use subjective assessments instead of formula driven measurements that 
exist in CPIF contracts. 
One concern with CP AF contracts is that the requirement for ACTD staffs to 
conduct the assessment required of this type of contract can cause a serious 
administrative burden. This would further exacerbate a problem expressed by one 
Technology Manager. that ACTD staffs, "are already working with skeleton staffing". 
Another point of concern with CP AF contract management is handling the fee not 
awarded at each evaluation. The decision must be made whether to roll the money 
forward and provide the contractor "another bite of the apple" or to extract the funds 
from the contract permanently. Either decision poses additional administrative burden. 
According to one of the DUSD(AT) executives the funding for ACTDs has been stable 
compared to other acquisitions. But the executive warned that as the program matures 
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the funding could become less stable and that contract monies withheld could become 
fair game for budget cuts. 
Since Class I ACTDs have a significant degree of uncertainty in the areas of cost, 
schedule and performance the researcher concludes that some type of cost reimbursement 
contract should be used. The application of which type of cost reimbursement contract 
would depend on the nature and scope of the system being procured. In a purely 
developmental contract situation the better contract vehicle would appear to be a CPFF 
since no accurate measure of level of effort could' be ascertained. A Class I ACTD 
involving mature technology or fully developed software application can be conducted 
under a CPIF contract. In this case, the maturity of the system would allow incentive 
targets to be assigned to elements of cost, schedule and performance and thus lessen the 
need to use a CP AF contract type. However, in most cases, a CP AF contract would be 
the recommended contract type since it affords the opportunity to provide tailored 
performance incentives in the absence of a highly developed system. 
B. CLASS II ACTDS 
1. Description of Class II ACTD~ 
Class II ACTDs were defined by the DUSD(AT) as "stand-alone" systems [Ref. 
77:p. 15] The systems associated with this class of ACTD are most closely related to the 
types of systems typically procured through the formal acquisition process. They are 
primarily weapon or sensor systems. If military utility is declared these ACTDs will 
most likely enter the DoD 5000 series Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
(EMD) production phase of transition or "will be planned to transition into Low-Rate 
Initial Production (LRIP), following the ACTD". [Ref. 34:pp. A32-A33] 
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In many cases a Class II ACTD will be planned to 
transition into LRIP following the ACTD, but there may be 
cases where it is appropriate to plan for additional 
development following the ACTD. For example, if the cost 
of weaponization is high in comparison to all other costs of 
the ACTD, the best strategy may be to assess military 
utility before incurring the full cost of weaponization. In 
this case the intended point of entry into the acquisition 
process could be the development portion of EMD. [Ref. 
61 :p. 7] 
Similar to the Class I ACTDs, Class II programs generally have residual assets 
after the ACTD process is complete, and these are made available to operational users. 
Like the Class I ACTDs, Class II programs involve a single product and will result in a 
residual item. [Ref. 77:p. 15] 
2. Representative Class II ACTDs 
Completed Class II ACTDs include the Boost Phase Intercept, the Low Life 
Cycle Cost, Medium-Lift' Helicopter, and the Predator UAV, the Counter Sniper and the 
Consequence Management ACTD. Not completed, but included for analysis is the High 
Altitude Endurance UA V ACTD. 
a. Kinetic Energy Boost Phase Intercept ACTD 
(1) Description. The Kinetic Energy Boost Phase Intercept 
(KE BPI) ACTD program was established to evaluate the affordability, mission 
effectiveness and operational utility of BPI engagements of tactical ballistic missiles. 
The technical approach involved the use of high-speed tactical missiles deployed from air 
breathing launch platforms such as F-14s. These missiles included kinetic kill vehicles 
and were intended to intercept ballistic missiles prior to their deployment of submunitions 
or countermeasures and before they rise above the influence of the atmosphere. [Ref. 
45:p. 1] 
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The joint Air Force and Navy effort took two months and $40 
million to conduct. The program efforts entailed the development of a concept of 
operations, establishment of a simulation of system performance, simulations to measure 
pilot responses to threat detection, and performance assessment performance based on the 
number of aircraft equipped with BPI capability. The assessment indicated that the BPI 
system would be feasible and place reasonable demands on the pilot. [Ref. 2:pp. 1-4, 5] 
The Ballistic Missile Defense Program Review concluded, however, that the program 
would require an excessive number of aircraft and was not affordable in the current 
budget environment. the decision was made to forego the $400 million prototype Phase 
II ACTD. [Ref. 45:p. 1] 
(2) Contracting Methods Employed. Following a review of the 
proposals received, the hardware systems for the Kinetic Energy BPI ACTD were 
contracted out in parallel. During the development stage there were two contractors, 
Lockheed-Martin and McDonnell-Douglas. Each contractor was working under a CPFF 
contract. The Government decided that the scope of the operation would be too great to 
field and the contracts were terminated. There was no transition contract vehicle in place 
for this ACTD program. 
h. Low Life Cycle Cost, Medium-Lift Helicopter ACTD 
(1) Description. The Low Life Cycle Cost, Medium Lift 
Helicopter ACTD objective was to assess the military utility of using commercial-off-
the-shelf (COTS) helicopters to perform Military Sealift Command (MSC) fleet vertical 
, 
lift support missions. The 'program, managed by the MSC in conjunction with U.S. 
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Atlantic Fleet, was assessed during at-sea operations between MSC and U.S. Navy ships 
August-October 1995. [Ref. 49:p. 1] 
The demonstration of leased commercial helicopters and crews 
was very successful with the Navy concluding that leasing commercial helicopters is a 
viable alternative to using military aircraft for vertical replenishment. The Navy 
conducted follow-on demonstrations and is considering the possibility of privatization for 
the MSC fleet. [Ref. 49:p. 1] 
(2) Contracting Methods Employed. The contractual basis was 
a fully supported lease that included all contractor maintenance and operations with 
guaranteed performance. The type of contract was Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) and was 
awarded on a best value basis following a competitive bid phase. 
c. Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VA 11 ACTD 
(1) Description. The Medium Altitude Endurance (MAU) 
UAV, Predator, ACTD was established to assess the military utility of a rapid 
deployment capable craft for medium altitude reconnaissance and surveillance. The need 
derived from the absence, at the time, of a n~tional tactical intelligence collection asset 
that could provide long dwell, near real-time releasable information on stationary and 
mobile targets. The two principal objectives of the Predator ACTD were to (1) quickly 
provide a deployment capability within a 30 month timeframe, and (2) develop a concept 
of operations that could be used for this and future endurance UAVs. The program had a 
directive to utilize COTS material integration to achieve low costs. The system was to 
employ ground, air and satellite platforms for cueing and be fully interoperable with 
existing platforms. [Ref. 51 :p. 1] 
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The Predator was successfully deployed and operational in 
Bosnia even before the end of the ACTD and has remained 
there since. This ACTD was completed after only nineteen 
months, in June 1996. Mr. Longuemare, Acting USD 
(A&T), signed the Predator Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum on 18 August 1997, approving Predator's 
entry into the low-rate initial production and production 
rate verification phase of the acquisition process. He 
delegated milestone decision authority to the Air Force 
Acquisition Executive. [Ref. 2:p. 1-5] 
(2) Contracting Methods Employed. Following a competition 
based on best value, General Atomics was selected among three RFP respondents. 
General Atomics was a sole source contractor in both the initial ACTD and production 
phases of the Predator program. Tom Perdue, the Assistant DUSD(AT), commented that 
that the sole source nature of both initial and transition contracts was unwanted but 
necessary due to the short-fused nature of the requirement. This, commented Perdue, was 
the biggest contracting problem involved in this ACTD. [Ref. 64] Without options for 
additional hardware procurement, or similar arrangements, the Government was forced to 
negotiate prices on development and production with a contractor that had already been 
designated as a sole source. 
The initial MAE UA V was conducted under a CPFF contract. 
Shortly after an initial demonstration held under actual operational conditions in Bosnia, 
a follow-on acquisition was made for an additional UAV under a CPIF contract where the 
incentive centered on the cost elements of the procurement. The remaining UAVs were 
procured under Fixed-Price-Incentive (FPI) contract where again the incentive centered 
on costs. 
As discussed previously, Predator was not planned to transition to 
full production. It was not until after a very successful showing of military utility and 
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high demand from the users in Bosnia that a transition period occurred. The need for the 
UAV in Bosnia was so great that the contractual requirement for a demonstration took 
place in theater in Bosnia. These factors lead to problems that were well documented in a 
1996 RAND study. These problems included poor logistics support for operational use 
of residuals and the difficulty of the sole source contractor to ramp up production to the 
level requested by the Government. Another problem arose when the Predator's 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) was not begun until the end of the ACTD. 
[Ref. 77:pp. 62-69] 
d. Counter Sniper ACTD 
(1) Description. The Counter Sniper ACTD was begun in an 
effort to bring emerging technologies for sniper detection together for evaluation with an 
eye toward gaining interim capability in a short term period. The principal objectives ~f 
the Counter Sniper ACTD were to (1) rapidly provide multiple sniper sensor systems to 
the military for evaluation, (2) develop skilled users who could evaluate the systems, and 
(3) be ready to deploy the systems rapidly if necessary. The Dismounted Battlespace 
Battle Laboratory (DBBL) was the primary user evaluator working in cooperation with 
the Marine Corps while the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) provided the technical 
evaluation. [Ref. 19:pp. 1,3] 
Over a short-term (four-month) period ending in November 1996, 
evaluations of four developing counter sniper system concepts were conducted. The 
broad range evaluations were conducted with the primary goal of determining the 
soundness of the technical approach and the system's ultimate utility. Three of the 
systems had military utility and ten prototype systems were made ready for rapid 
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deployment with one of the systems deployed in the Olympic Village at Ft. Benning for 
the 1996 Summer Olympic Games. Due to the success of the demonstrated prototypes, 
the Army and DARPA are examining additional mobile vehicle-mounted and helmet-
mounted counter-sniper detection systems for further development. [Ref. 2:p. 1-6] 
(2) Contracting Methods Employed. According to a former 
Demonstration Manager the Government wanted to assess ongoing counter sniper 
research and development efforts with little or no disruption to those efforts. The 
emphasis of the contracting effort was on speed due to the short schedule allowed for the 
ACTD. Therefore contracts were established to achieve close cooperation with 
contractors and to minimize any engineering changes or additions. 
There were no new contracting efforts involved in the Counter 
Sniper ACTD. The pre-existing programs' demonstrations were evaluated and a "best of 
. . 
breed" competition was used to down select for further evaluation and possible follow-on 
acquisition. 
e. Consequence Management ACrn 
(1) De~cription. The Consequence Management (also known 
as "BIO 911") ACTD arose from a recognized need for an organized, rapid crisis 
response and consequence management in the event of a biological warfare (BW) 
terrorist act in the United States. A domestic BW attack might require a DoD component 
to be a first respondent that is called upon to coordinate with Federal agencies such as the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and consequence managers like the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). DoD and other Services and agencies had 
only sampling and collection tools for responses. Actual analysis and identification of 
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specific agent would have to be conducted off-site and after significant delay. The need 
was then delineated for on-site detection and identification of agents to aid in the timely 
and effective consequence management ofBW attacks. [Ref. 18:pp. 1-2] 
The Consequence Management ACTD fully satisfied its 
demonstration objectives. It showed the military capability to perform in a supporting 
role for consequence management of BW attacks and to detect and model a simulated 
BW disaster fo~ consequence management. Participating units adopted the concept of 
operations developed by the ACTD and will procure favorably assessed technologies. 
[Ref. 2:p. 1-6] The executive agent for the Consequence Management ACTD is the 
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear, Chemical and Biological). The 
Operational Evaluator is the Defense Evaluation Support Agency (DESA) while the 
Dugway Proving Ground is the Technical Evaluator. [Ref. 18:p. 5] 
(2) Contracting Methods Employed. The Consequence 
Management, or BIO 911, ACTD emerged as a demonstration of various state, local and 
Federal government agencies' ability to react in the event of a biological warfare 
emergency. According to one of the principal contractors involved in the ACTD, the 
ACTD was a "large show and tell training session". The predominant contracting 
method employed the purchase of COTS material from various sources. The sources 
were Government laboratories and civilian suppliers of chemical testing material. This 
was a highly specialized and tailored ACTD. 
f. High Altitude Endurance UAV ACTD 
(1) Description. There are no systems currently capable of 
providing continuous, high altitude, long range, wide area, all-weather coverage of 
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targets that is sufficient to support a precision strike. The High Altitude Endurance 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HAE UA V) ACTD was established to address the existing 
theater airborne asset limitations of endurance, force structure, and access to denied 
airspace. The specific objectives of the HAE UAV "are 1) to address, to the greatest 
extent possible, the military high altitude, endurance, UA V reconnaissance/surveillance 
need at an air vehicle Unit Fixed Price (UFP) of $1 OM (FY94), and 2) to validate a new 
acquisition strategy for the HAE UAV System." [Ref. 37:p. 1] 
The HAE UAV is comprised of two aerial vehicles, the Global 
Hawk and Dark Star, and a Common Ground Segment (CGS). The CGS is made up of 
communications systems, a mission control element, and a launch and recovery element. 
The Global Hawk is designed for reliable long--endurance flights in a less threatening 
environment. The Dark Star is designed to be a stealthy, low-observable vehicle that will 
be employed in a heightened threat environment. Both aerial vehicles are being 
optimized to achieve a $10 million (FY94) Unit Flyaway Price (UFP). The technologies 
used in both vehicles have proven effective and are increasingly affordable. DARPA, as 
the Executive Agent, is emphasizing the use of COTS components and technologies in 
both programs to achieve the $10 million UFP. [Ref. 37:pp. 2-3, 5] 
(2) Contracting Methods Employed. Despite the fact that it has 
not yet completed the demonstration phase, the HAE UA V was included in the examples 
of Class II because of the use of Section 845, Other Transaction (OT), contracting 
methodology.4 
4 For further explanation on this type of contracting authority please refer to, "Authority to Carry Out 
Certain Prototype Projects", (10 U.S.C.2371, Section 845), Dec 14, 1996. 
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The intent behind the use of OTs is to facilitate streamlined 
acquisition and field systems in a shortened cycle. The process is designed to reduce 
overhead and reduce development and procurement costs. According to the managers of 
the RAE UAV program, OTs are not contracts in the legal sense of the word, but are an 
experiment in streamlined acquisition. Irrespective of designation, the OT method of 
procurement is being used successfully in conjunction with Cost As an Independent 
Variable (CAIV) objectives ($10 million fly-away cost) in this ACTD to capitalize on the 
flexibility and presumed benefits of OTs. One DARPA executive explained that the key 
feature of the RAE UAV program was the maximized emphasis on affordability. The 
agreements contain no technical requirements or specifications, just a single price 
requirement. The technical and performance goals are subject to trade-offs that are left to 
the contractors. With a pre-determined production UAV price, performance is driven by 
military needs and contractors' desire to meet those needs and thus obtaining a 
production-buy decision. The contract type now employed is a Cost Share type cost· 
reimbursement contract. This arrangement is CAIV driven and incentivizes the 
contractors to strive for efficient performance and effective trade-offs that reduce cost but 
maintain performance levels. 
The benefits recognized by a DARPA representative include the 
lessened likelihood of General Accounting Office (GAO) protests and removal of the 
need to seek waivers from typical acquisition requirements since these prototype projects 
are not required to comply with various procurement statutes or parts of the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). OT authority provides the opportunity to Government 
Contracting Officers to construct agreements that ,use commercial-like practices. For 
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instance, DARPA relies upon the contractor's internal auditors to review and certify 
accounting procedures and documents, augmented by a bi-annual review by independent 
auditors instead of using of Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). 
Another unusual feature of this procurement is the use of a second 
round of competition after initial award. This is a concern and goal for all ACTD 
managers but, as the research indicates, is rarely achieved. Phase I of the procurement 
was a design competition involving a solicitation that requested innovative solutions from 
industry. The solicitation garnered fourteen proposals from a wide range of contractors. 
Within three months of program initiation, five awards were made which included CPFF, 
CPIF and Cost Sharing contracting types. Phase II of the ACTD was established to 
procure additional systems following initial design review and further development 
efforts. Phase II was initiated six months after Phase I and the competition was held wi'fl.1 
past performance as a sole criterion. This resulted in a down selection to two contractors 
with Cost Sharing as the contract type used with both. 
3. Analysis of Contracting Methods Employed in Class II ACTDs 
The hardware systems in Class II ACTDs most closely resemble those acquired in 
major system procurements. As seen in the representative ACTDs, the spectrum of the 
types of systems demonstrated is broad. The contract types applied in Class II ACTDs 
are equally varied and are closely tailored to the system being procured. Typically the 
purchase of hardware systems is accomplished in a variety of methods and appears to 
defy a systematic application of any particular contract method. However, the ACTD 
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Program requirement for mature technology might provide an opportunity to provide 
more restricted guidance as to contract type. 
The ACTD process should, as discussed In Chapter II, provide some risk 
mitigation for a program. ACTDs focus on the use, rather than the development, of 
relatively mature technology. Due to lower risks in the "core system", the ACTD 
program's technical risk is significantly reduced. By acquiring mature technologies the 
Government should, according to the researcher, be able to ascertain sufficient cost data 
to avoid the contract types involved in pure res'earch and development-type situations, 
especially in the procurement of hardware. 
The level of technological maturity has a large influence on the risk levels 
involved in any project. Typically with a greater maturity level of technology comes a 
reduced level of cost and performance risks. While ACTDs do not eliminate those risks 
in their entirety, they do require relatively mature technology. This may afford 
Government contracting officers the opportunity to employ, in some cases, a fixed-price 
contracting arrangement. This circumstance was evident in two ACTDs. The 
Consequence Management ACTD involved the FFP contract purchase of COTS material. 
The Low Life Cycle Cost - Medium Lift Helicopter ACTD contract was Firm-Fixed 
Price (FFP) for a fully supported lease that included all contractor maintenance and 
operations with guaranteed performance. This contract was awarded on a best value 
basis following a competitive bid phase. These ACTDs are the exception rather than the 
rule as they produced no appreciable new technology and only a moderately innovative 
concept in its demonstration. The other Class II ACTDs involve less mature technologies 
and would incur significantly more cost, schedule and performance risks. In most cases 
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the initial application of fixed price type contracts would require contractors to take on an 
unrealistic portion of the cost risks involved in the process. 
Caution should also be taken by contracting officers to avoid a movement too far 
in the direction of contracts that are best suited to pure research and development. The 
perils in this type of arrangement can be seen in the contracting for the Kinetic Energy 
BPI ACTD, w4ich resulted in a parallel award with each contractor working under a 
CPFF contract. Although successfully demonstrated the Government decided that the 
scope of the operation would be too great to field and the contracts were terminated. As 
discussed in the analysis of Class I ACTD contracts, CPFF contracts are best when 
applied in situations in which there is considerable risk and cost/schedule uncertainty. 
CPFF contracts provide the contractor little incentive to control costs. This may have 
contributed to the high costs in the Kinetic Energy BPI ACTD and the ultimate decision 
to cancel the program despite a successful demonstration of military utility. There was 
no indication from the research that another contract type could not have been used in 
this case. Clearly a cost-incentivized contract might have produced a different outcome. 
Even where the program feels that the use of a CPFF contract is necessary the 
program should be able to gain enough information to eventually attain a different 
contract arrangement, as witnessed in the case of the Predator DAV ACTD. For the 
second unit purchased the Predator program switched from a CPFF to a CPIF contract, 
with an incentive on cost. The remaining DAVs were procured under a Fixed-Price-
Incentive (FPI) contract where again the incentive centered on costs. While these cost 
control methods are discussed as a positive course of action, the reader should note that 
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the motivation of the Predator program to pursue these measures was due, at least in part, 
to the sole source nature of this acquisition. 
Another DAV ACTD,' the Tactical UAV "Outrider", though not complete has 
thus far been conducted with a CPIF contractual arrangement. A full and open 
competition was conducted, including foreign sources, which incorporated an optional 
light demonstration in the proposal. The selection of the source was conducted on a best 
value basis whe~e technical performance outweighed cost in the selection criteria. Cost 
risks were mitigated by competition, the level of technological maturity involved, and 
requiring a phased price LRIP option for six additional aircraft. The incentives were 
primarily on cost objectives. [Ref: 50] Again the level of maturity played a key role in 
the selection of this contract type. Where the confidence in actual costs is high or 
competition is keen the onus to incur risk is lifted and the contracting officer is afforded 
flexibility in choosing the contract type 
Another airframe-related ACTD still in process is the Miniature Air Launched 
Decoy (MALD). This ACTD was established with a CPAF contract. The incentives 
were primarily on cost objectives and management systems. According to a contract 
manager involved, the project had high confidence in the cost estimates that provided the 
opportunity to go through the demonstration phase with' a CP AF contract arrangement. It 
is anticipated and planned that the follow on acquisition in the production phase will be 
competed again and be awarded under a Firm':'Fixed-Price (FFP) contract. The 
complexity of the MALD airframe and mission is significantly less than that of the three 
UAVs discussed previously. The lower degree of complexity afforded the ACTD 
managers a better opportunity to make solid cost estimates with a higher degree of 
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confidence and provided the flexibility to choose a CP AF contract type. The decision to 
establish a CPAF contract was also influenced by, in the words of one MALD staff 
member, "the surprising and consistently low costs quoted in the proposals". According 
to that staff member the funding problem was alleviated and they could give the 
contractor some incentive to keep other system objectives in the forefront of the 
contractor's mind. 
The use of Other Transactions (OT) authority in the case of the RAE DAV 
presents another approach that Government Contracting Officers are pursuing at 
DARPA. While this .authority is not a contract type it does allow the Government 
flexibility in constructing contracts that use more commercial-like practices. By granting 
contracting officials relief from parts of the FAR, Congress was seeking to encourage 
more commercial companies to do business with DoD. The Congressional Budget Office 
noted that although justification my exist for the use of OTs in ACTDs, the "systematic 
use of such agreements for ACTDs might raise the issue of whether those projects were . 
receiving sufficient oversight." [Ref. 16:p. 22] Research indicates that there is not 
systematic use of this authority as the RAE DA V is the only ACTD program exercising 
section 845 OT authority. This is a contracting strategy option that presents an enhanced 
opportunity for contracting officials to achieve the cost and schedule goals of the ACTD 
Program. In achieving the goal of OTs to increase participation from industry, ACTD 
programs can increase competition in ACTDs and open the door to more new technology 
insertion for the military. 
Research indicates that the transition of ACTDs to full production is more likely 
to occur in Class II ACTDs than either Class I or Class III ACTDs. Class II ACTDs are 
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most similar to formal acquisition programs where multiple items are required while the 
Class I and Class III ACTDs' residuals or mere results, more often than not, serve to 
satisfy the service or agency's requirement. 
To date the Predator MAE DAV is the only Class II ACTD that has transitioned 
to full production. The research indicates that the program was not properly prepared to 
go into the production phase. As a direct result of that ACTD, current DDSD(AT) 
guidance through the ACTD Master Plan now requires candidate ACTDs to identify a 
planned method of procurement for follow on production units for any ACTD where it is 
anticipated that the transition to production will occur. The recommended approaches 
are: (1) to obtain priced options for production of additional units up front when the 
competitive offers are being solicited, (2) to solicit non-binding information from 
contractors on future production pricing that DoD could then use to analyze the issue of 
affordability in the source selection phase, and (3) to either contract sole source with the 
ACTD contractor or to "compete" the development program in situations when the 
ACTD program is to enter a development program at the conclusion of the ACTD. The 
program may plan to compete the developmel!t from the outset of the program or adopt 
the plan after the ACTD results in a conclusion that further development is warranted. 
An in depth discussion of the suggested contract methodology can be found in 
conjunction with transition issues in Chapter III. Also discussed are the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the suggested alternatives. Research has revealed that 
there are insufficient data available to analyze the relative success of the separate 
transition contact methods at this time. 
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C. CLASS III ACTDS 
1. Description of Class III ACTDs 
The DUSD(AT) defined Class III ACTDs as a "system of systems". This class of 
ACTD program usually involves several "weapons systems integrated within an 
overarching framework" [Ref. 77:p. 15]. Individual elements within this framework may 
be a fielded system, a system in acquisition, or an emerging technology. There are often 
several Program Executive Officers and multiple Military Departments involved in this 
ACTD class which present integration and coordination challenges to achieving the 
capability represente'd in the ACTD. [Ref. 34:pp. A32-A33] 
Most of the individual elements of this class of ACTD may already be in use or in 
the acquisition process for some other function or program. However, a totally new 
capability may be established by the acquisition and integration of additional elements in 
to an ACTD architecture. This new capability could then transition into full production 
for use at a later date. The transition of Class III ACTDs can be challenging to achieve. 
"The transition of Class III ACTDs is the most difficult from a coordination perspective 
due to the complexity and lack of precedent for many of the activities." [Ref. 66:pp. 18-
19] 
2. Representative Class III ACTDs 
The two examples of Class III ACTDs which have completed the demonstration 
phase are the Cruise Missile Defense Phase I and PrecisioniRapid Counter - Multiple 
Rocket Launch (MRL) programs. 
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a. Cruise Missile Defense Phase I 
(1) Description. The Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) Phase I 
ACTD, also known as 'Mountain Top" focuses on the detection and engagement of 
cruise missile targets that are beyond the radar horizon. The goal of the CMD ACTD 
was to prove the operational capability and military utility of detecting, tracking and 
successfully engaging cruise missiles from ranges beyond the line-of-sight of radar 
located aboard surface-based air defense units. The ACTD was also to be used to assess 
joint concepts of operations. Typical for Class III ACTDs there were several agencies 
involved in the CMD ACTD. The Chief of Naval Research was the Executing Agent for 
Phase I, while the overall Executing Agent is the Office of Naval Research (ONR) [Ref. 
21 :pp. 1,3] 
.The Phase I demonstration of the v;rrious systems' was complet~d 
in January 1996 and was successful in achieving the program's ACTD objectives. Those 
objectives included the use of mountain top sensors, surveillance radar, missile fire 
control tracker/illuminator, and communications to simulate the surrogate airborne 
platform. Some specific results of the demonstration and operational requirements for 
future employment are classified. [Ref. 21 :p. 1] The concept of an elevated sensor was 
proven very successful and has been incorporated in cruise missile defense architectures 
since the demonstration. [Ref. 26:p. 3] 
(2) Contracting Methods Employed. The principal system of 
this Class III ACTD was the radar system and components. The ACTD was established 
to test the capability of this radar and other systems to address specific operations. There 
, were no new contractual arrangements established in the conduct of the ACTD as all 
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components were either in current development or previously procured. The connectivity 
and integration was developed and conducted in-house by Government agencies and 
services. 
No transition to formal acquisition was planned or executed 
following the demonstration phase of this ACTD. However the CONOPS was evaluated 
as successful and will be used for possible employment of the technology in the future. 
h. PrecisionlRapid Counter - Multiple Rocket Launch (PRC-MRL) 
ACTD 
(1) Description. 
The U.S. Army Joint Precision Strike Demonstration 
(JPSD) began the CMRL ACTD effort by evaluating the 
total battlefield as a "system of systems" to identify the 
critical path networks that define the time available to 
identify and strike high priority, time-sensitive 240mm 
MRL and 170mm SP Gun targets. Potential solutions were 
designed, tested and revised, and ultimately evolved into a 
comprehensive solution comprised of recommended 
improvements to doctrine, organization, tactics, logistics 
and materials (DOTLMs). [Ref. 69:p. 1] 
The Precision/Rapid Counter-Multiple Rocket Launch (PRC-
MRL) ACTD proved its capability by leveraging and integrating various current, 
emerging, and advanced technologies and resources. The success of the demonstration 
was illustrated in significant improvements in factors necessary to effectively neutralize 
the threat. The ACTD showed a reduction in sensor-to-shooter timelines by a factor of 
three, increased counterfire accuracy, and significantly reduced the PRC-MRL threat to 
Seoul and to deployed U.S. and coalition forces. These ACTD systems are currently in 
use and standing watch with the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea. The PRC MRL ACTD 
was not contemplated to transition into production due to its specialized nature but the 
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technology from this ACTD is being transitioned into current acquisition program 
baselines. [Ref. 69:p. 1] 
(2) Contracting Methods Employed. The majority of contracts 
used in the PRC MRL system of systems were extensions of contracts in existence prior to 
the initiation of the ACTD. Most of the previous contracts were those remaining from a 
large number of Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) that had been used in the 
development of similar technologies. Only one significant element of the ACTD was 
newly created and competed. This element of the system was awarded using a CPFF 
contract. One manager involved in the program commented that pre-existing contracts 
were used with program time constraints as the motivating factor and because the majority 
of the pre-existing contracts involved similar technology to that sought in the PRC MRL. 
The pre-existing contracts were primarily omnibus contracts that were extended or 
expanded to accommodate the additional requirements of the ACTD. 
There was no plan to transition the system into the formal 
acquisition process. The intention was to prove a technology and integration ability. The 
technology was proven successful and has been incorporated in other program baselines. 
3. Analysis of Contracting Methods Employed in Class III ACTDs 
Class III ACTDs are essentially a "system of systems" and utilize a great deal of 
items that are already in use or in the acquisition process under other programs. There is 
less major procurement and development of products in the Class III ACTD programs 
than seen in the Class I and Class II ACTDs. This results in the frequent use of pre-
existing contracts and less likelihood that the ACTDs will transition into the formal 
acquisition process. 
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As previously discussed, the two representative ACTD programs each chose to 
use pre-existing contracts for the majority of the program procurement and development. 
Managers from both programs commented that time constraint was the primary reason 
for the use of the pre-existing contracts. In the CMD ACTD, the radar was the principal 
element of the program. The radar had been in development for some time prior to the 
formulation of the ACTD, which was intended to demonstrate an enhanced capability of 
the radar and linked systems. The ACTD was never intended to leave residuals or 
transition to production. PrecisionlRapid Counter MRL ACTD presented similar 
circumstances. In bot!). ACTDs the premium was on time as the multiple systems were 
put together to show a capability and then disbanded. The contracting for an entirely new 
set of system components would not have met the time objectives and would have proven 
too costly. 
The research indicates that the situation faced by the two completed ACTDs is 
common. Seven of the eight Class III programs that responded to the researcher's survey· 
indicated that the primary contracting methodology was to use pre-existing contracts 
(primarily CPFF contracts) and systems. Again, the overriding impetus for this 
occurrence was to meet schedule constraints. Though they still were required to change 
contract scopes and negotiate revised targets costs, five program executives listed cost 
savings as a reason for using existing contracting vehicles. The basis for the cost savings 
could be found in the administrative costs that were significantly reduced by choosing to 
extend contracts rather than create new ones. 
The typical Class III ACTD environment involves the integration and 
coordination of various systems in an operational ellvironment. Research has shown that 
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most Class III ACTDs require some integrating software development similar to the 
Class I software development items. The scale of development does not appear to be as 
large in Class III ACTDs. With the scale of the pure development reduced, the contract 
managers appear to have more flexibility to piggyback requirements on pre-existing 
contracts rather than create new contracts on a competitive basis. This has proven to be 
somewhat time effective and thus addresses one of the primary goals of the ACTD 
process in reducing cycle time. 
The extensive use of pre-existing contracts in Class III, while nearly universal, 
was not without its critics. One program manager commented that it is a shortsighted 
strategy. The criticism centers on the lack of real administrative time and cost savings 
and a lack of autonomous control for the program. The extension or expansion of these 
contracts in many cases created workload and administrative burdens on the Government 
and industry that were unanticipated and proved costly, both in tenns of time and money 
spent amending the contracts that were already in place. Another drawback of this 
method of contracting is the detrimental effect on competition, as the extensions are de 
facto sole source contracts. 
One manager commented that if the ACTD program were to be created anew, it 
would be better for the program to use sole source justification to create a new CPIF 
contract. This, according to the source, would allow the program to exercise more 
control over the contractor and afford the contractor the opportunity to deal with a single 
program and its demands. One concern that was echoed by several Class III program 
managers was that the use and expansion of existing contracts placed an additional 
burden on contractors involved in those contracts. The managers noted that the 
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additional burden involves taking on workload responsibilities that can be as demanding 
as a new contract requirement and, in most cases, be required to work with and answer to 
more than one service or agency. 
The use of new contracts, whether CPIF or other types of contracts, would be 
most effective in addressing the performance risks faced by contracting officers and 
program managers. The ACTD program would place itself in a better leverage position 
with the contractor. Management personnel in any program must assess the relative 
administrative and workload burden that would be imposed on any contractor working 
under a pre-existing agreement with the Government. The degree of complexity of the 
existing and new requirements would have to be considered along with the cost, schedule 
and performance objectives of the ACTD to assess whether to seek modifications to 
current contracts or to .form new ones. 
The Rapid Force Projection Initiative ACTD is the single responding Class III 
that is not using pre-existing contracts as a primary tool for the ACTD. Instead, the 
program used a very decentralized and cost restrictive strategy. The program involved 
the extensive use of COTS items and highly mature technology in creating almost 
exclusively FFP contracts. The contracting for the various hardware systems was 
assigned to the various organizations involved in the process, all with a fixed operating 
budget. This approach was based on the special nature and circumstances of the program 
and was highly tailored. 
The strategy of using FFP contracts, while effective to achieve the RFPI 
objectives, is not likely to be applicable to many ACTDs. The FFP contract places too 
much cost risk on the contractor and would likely increase performance risks and the 
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chance for contractor default. Even Class III ACTDs involve a great deal of effort that is 
research and development (R&D) in nature. This R&D, coupled with possible extensive 
integration efforts, may necessitate the use of a cost reimbursement contract. As stated 
before, the uncertainties in the estimates of total cost in software development generally 
preclude the use of any type of fixed price contract vehicle. 
D. CHAPTER IV SUMMARY 
Chapter IV of this study provides an in-depth description of the three classes of 
ACTDs. Various examples of each class of ACTD are used to explain the differences 
between the classes and are examined to determine the contracting methods employed to 
contract for ACTDs in the particular class. These and other contracting methods are 
analyzed for their relative effectiveness, success or failure, and general applicability to 
the ACTD Class. 
Class I ACTD programs are described as "information systems with special 
purpose software operating on commercial workstations". Ute software procured and 
demonstrated in this class is usually sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the service or 
agency. The Class I ACTDs typically do not and· are not planned to be transitioned into 
the formal acquisition process. 
The Advanced Joint Planning and Synthetic Theater of War ACTDs were 
described as the examples of Class I ACTDs. The two programs have completed the 
demonstration phase of the ACTD and each uses a CPFF type contract. The merits of 
cost reimbursement contract types; CPFF, CPIF, CP AF and fixed price contract options 
were examined to analyze whether they would be generally applicable to Class I ACIDs 
now and in the future. 
104 
Class II ACTDs programs are examined and described as stand alone hardware 
systems which most closely resemble the typical major system acquisition programs. 
The programs of this ACTD Class are described as those most likely to transition to full 
production in the formal acquisition process. 
Again several examples of completed ACTDs are provided. These examples 
include the Kin~tic Energy Boost Phase Intercept, the Low Life Cycle Cost, Medium-Lift 
Helicopter, and the Predator DAV, the Counter Sniper and the Consequence Management 
ACTD. Not completed but included for analysis is the High Altitude Endurance DA V 
ACTD. The broad range of Class II systems, contact types, and contract strategies are 
discussed for each example and the strategies and methods are analyzed for their success 
and ability to achieve the objectives of the individual and overarching ACTD Programs. 
The contracting strategies and contract types for transitioning ACTDs to full production 
via the formal acquisition process are also discussed in the Class II ACTD section. 
Class III ACTD programs are also examined in Chapter IV. These ACTD 
programs are described as a system of systems that usually involves several weapons 
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systems integrated within an overarching framework. Class III ACTDs are classified as 
involving various components that are either already in use or in the acquisition pipeline 
in another program. 
Two completed Class III ACTDs are given as examples of the class. Both the 
Cruise Missile Defense Phase I and PrecisionlRapid Counter - Multiple Rocket Launch 
(MRL) programs are described and the method of contracting for the programs identified. 
As with the other classes, the Class II program contracting methods and rationale are 
examined. The merits of using pre-existing contracts are contrasted with the use of 
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various cost reimbursement and fixed price contract options were examined to analyze 
whether they would be generally applicable to current and future Class III ACTDs. 
The next chapter provides a summary of previous chapters and this chapter's 
research, analysis and findings. The primary and secondary research questions are 
answered. Additionally, this chapter provides recommendations (with comments) that 
might be employed by Government contracting personnel in contracting for future 
ACTDs. Finally, Chapter V lists areas for further research regarding ACTDs. 
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v. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the contracting methods employed by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) in the three defined classes of Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Programs and detennine if contracting methodology 
is a critical decision element in the ACTD process. 
The traditional acquisition process was explained and examined with major 
advantages and disadvantages of the process discussed. The ACTD program and its 
processes were defined and examined, then compared to the traditional acquisition 
process to help the reader distinguish between the two and discern the nuances of the 
ACTD Program. Also identified and discussed were major issues and concerns identified 
with the ACTD process and transition to formal acquisition. 
Each class of ACTD's unique characteristics, lessons learned, procedural and 
decision processes, and actual or predicted outcomes were considered and used to 
evaluate the contracting methods employed b~ DoD in ACTD programs. The reasons for 
use and relative success or failure of these methods were assessed to determine whether 
they are required or should be recommended for use in future programs. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
The technological nature and uncertain outcome of Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) present unique challenges for 
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Government Contracting Officers but is the choice of a particular 
contracting method really critical to the ACTD process? 
The results of this research indicate that one must determine exactly what form of 
system and level of technology is involved in the class of ACTD (or ACTDs in general) 
to adequately address the question of whether the choice of a particular contracting 
method is re~ly critical to the ACTD process. The research shows that there are 
numerous levels of technology on the mature technology continuum. This poses a 
significant difficulty when one addresses the proper contract type to apply to the 
acquisition of any given system or class of systems involved in ACTDs. 
The existence of highly diverse ACTD programs is indicative of the flexibility 
sought by DoD when it began the program in 1994. This diversity in systems is matched 
by the diversity of contracting methods employed. There is a high degree of tailoring 
required in the contracting process for each ACTD. Government Contracting Officers 
are using various contract types and contracting strategies to achieve the objectives' of the 
individual ACTDs and ACTD Program as a whole. Though some isolated difficulties 
exist, the results to date have been successful. 
The researcher concludes that the choice of a particular contracting method for 
any ACTD Class is not critical to the process. Positive results have been achieved using 
a variety of contract types and contracting strategies. Though some alternative methods 
might have produced more efficient or cost effective results, the positive results achieved 
to date obviates the need to prescribe a specific contract methodology to the ACID 
process. As with more traditional acquisition programs, the contracting strategy should 
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be tailored and based upon the requirements and objectives of the particular system and 
program. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a. What is the traditional acquisition process and what are the 
relative benefits and disadvantages currently attributed to that 
process? 
The traditional approach to major system acquisition within DoD involves 
both development and procurement elements. These elements are addressed in a series of 
four distinct phases. The first of these phases explores the various weapons concepts. 
The second involves the definition of how the system will look and the shape it will take. 
The system plans are refined through engineering and manufacturing development in the 
third phase. In the final phase the system is produce4 in larger quantities and ~e 
operational and logistical support concerns for use in the field are addressed. 
This traditional method of development and procurement provides some 
definite advantages. First, the system has been in place for many years so Government 
and industry acquisition personnel have a great deal of familiarity with the process. The 
methods employed in the process have, over the course of time, been refmed and 
amended to best serve the Government's interests. 
Another advantage is the amount of review and oversight involved in the 
formal acquisition process. Oversight and consistent program review can help evaluate 
and 'mitigate the risk involved to help serve the Government's and, consequently, the 
public's interests. 
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A final major advantage is the ability of Program Managers and 
acquisition personnel to tailor the process to best accommodate the acquisition. Tailoring 
allows the use of the traditional risk reduction measures while still working within a 
familiar and refined process. 
This traditional method of development and procurement also presents 
some challenges and disadvantages. One of the principal disadvantages to the traditional 
acquisition process is also one of its advantages: the amount of review and oversight. 
The extensive amount of time involved in these and other traditional DoD acquisition 
process measures can become laborious and very costly. 
The extreme length of an acquisition program can also create a significant 
competitive disadvantage. By forgoing short-term solutions for longer-term, major 
systems solutions, DoD can jeopardize the military capability to combat new more 
advanced technological forces and threats. 
h. What is an ACTD? 
The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program was initiated 
in 1994 as a way of allowing military services or defense agencies to adapt or utilize new, 
but mature or significantly developed, technologies to construct prototype systems that 
address urgent military needs. 
c. How does the ACTD acquisition process differ from the 
traditional acquisition process? 
An ACTD is not an acquisition program but was intended to be, and has 
become, a pre-acquisition activity that allows the user to operate and assess the military 
utility of a prototype before a decision to acquire takes place. If a decision to acquire 
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more systems occurs, the program will enter the formal acquisition process at some point 
downstream from the normal starting point of concept development. ACTDs thus can 
become a facilitating element to the formal acquisition process. 
Differences can be seen between traditional and ACTD acquisition 
processes in the institution and implementation of acquisition reform measures. The 
ACTD program was viewed as a core element in improving our acquisition system. It 
was designed to reduce cycle time and use teaming arrangements and performance 
specifications to efficiently structure the procurement. An ACTD allows the services and 
agencies to forego or simultaneously conduct steps of the formal acquisition process. 
The difference in acquisition process structure is also reflected in the 
recording and reporting requirements involved in the ACTD process. The ACTD process 
has utilized minimal supportability documentation, while the formal acquisition program 
requires a significantly more supportability data and reference documents. 
Another difference between the two processes can be found in the 
development of the ORD. While both involve continuous ORD development, the ACTD 
process does not concentrate on a highly intensive up-front effort as seen in traditional 
acquisitions. Managers of the demonstrations construct or select prototype systems and 
turn them over to commanders to evaluate the technology in the field. Minor changes 
based on operational capability or utility can be made that make the prototype more 
acceptable. The ACTD ORD development can then be made to reflect the design and 
capability of the prototype. 
A final difference in the comparison involves the formal planning for 
supportability of the acquisition. ACTD residuals include planned support for a period of 
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only two years. Formal acquisition programs must include supportability plans, logistics 
support analysis, life cycle cost estimates; ACTD programs do not. 
d. What, if any, general contracting method recommendations for 
Government Contracting Officers can be derived from 
completed and current ACTD programs? 
As discussed in the primary research question conclusion, there are a 
variety of system types and levels of maturity currently in place in the ACTD Program. 
The research has clearly established, through the examination of the various classes and 
systems the need for tailored acquisition procedures to the highest degree possible. This 
tailoring is essential to afford ACTD managers the opportunity to capitalize on existing 
technologies and capabilities and to meet the varied goals and objectives of the different 
ACTD programs. 
While the need to tailor the acquisition process to the program objectives 
is essential, the separation of the ACTDs into the three classes does provide some 
opportunity to issue some recommendations in the acquisition of the ACTD systems. 
Class I ACTDs are primarily software development programs and, as 
such, present the most uniform alliance in the methodology of contract type employment. 
The systems involved in Class I ACTDs are very much related to typical research and 
development efforts and as such will virtually require a cost reimbursement type of 
contractual arrangement. The specific type of contract should be tailored to the system 
but the research indicates that the level of confidence in estimating cost, schedule and 
performance may preclude the effective and efficient use of incentive type arrangements. 
These systems, though they may involve pre-existing software, still require a significant 
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degree of development effort and integration with other systems. The typical contract 
type in this class is a Cost-Plus Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract. The concern in this type of 
arrangement is that the control over the contractor is lessened without an incentive 
arrangement. Government contracting officers should seek to mitigate these concerns by 
establishing properly tailored oversight, realistic delivery schedules and clearly defined 
performance specifications and system objectives. The recommended type of contract in 
Class I ACTDs is a Cost-Plus Award Fee (CPAF) 
Class II ACTDs are most closely related to the typical major system 
procurement situations.. The purchase of hardware systems is accomplished in a variety 
of methods and defies the systematic application of any particular contract method. The 
Government contracting officer involved in an ACTD in Class II should explore the 
various methods discussed in this research and. devise a contracting strategy that will 
accomplish the goals of the program and capitalize on the advantages provided in the 
ACTD Program. The use of Other Transactions (OTs) has, to date, been almost· 
exclusively a function of the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA). 
The flexibility provided in this method of acquisition married with the initiatives of the 
ACTD Program can be an effective means of dealing with the acquisition of ACTDs and 
follow-on production. Services and agencies should explore all contract types and 
acquisition methods, including OTs, in developing the contracting strategy. 
Class III ACTDs essentially involve a "system of systems" that requires 
less major procurement and development of products than the Class I and Class II 
ACTDs. This results in the frequent use of pre-existing contracts and less likelihood that 
the ACTDs will transition into the formal acquisitioJl process. With the scale of the pure 
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development reduced, the contract managers appear to have more flexibility to piggyback 
requirement on pre-existing contracts rather than create new contracts on a competitive 
basis. This practice should be continued to a high degree due to the effective 
achievement of one of the primary goals of the ACTD process in reducing cycle time. 
This process also allows for pre-existing cost analysis and performance oversight 
measures to be utilized. The one Class III item for which Government Contracting 
Officers should consider using new contracts is the integration software that is used to 
link systems within the ACTD. Research has ·shown that the scale of software 
development is not as extensive as experienced in Class I ACTDs but use of new 
contracts, whether CPIF or other types of contracts, would be most effective in 
addressing the performance risks faced by contracting officers and program managers. 
There are inadequate data from which to analyze the methods employed in 
the transition to the formal acquisition and production of ACTD systems. However, 
ACTD programs should, given the high levels of technology maturity required for ACTD 
selection and to complete initial demonstration, have enough cost level confidence to 
proceed to follow on production with a contr~ct that places more of the cost risk burden 
on to the contractor. Programs should develop, from the initiation of the ACTD, cost 
data that will allow production contracts via the formal acquisition process to be under 
fixed cost arrangements. The nature of any demonstration program is to reduce the risks 
in the acquisition process. The buyers in these programs should be more informed and 
more likely to ensure that operational requirements are met and cost estimates are 
sufficiently accurate to proceed with a fixed cost contract. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACQUISITIONS 
1. The ACTD process should remain highly flexible in order to achieve 
the objectives for which it was established. 
To begin to institutionalize the ACTD process would run the risk of creating a 
process that resembles the formal acquisition process. It is that process that the ACTD 
Program was designed to augment, by allowing mature technology to be inserted into the 
warfighters hands in a more rapid fashion than was currently practiced under the formal 
process. 
2. The ACTD Program should continue to afford Government 
Contracting Officers the ability to tailor the ACTD acquisition 
process to the needs of the particular program. 
The wide variety of systems procured and demonstrated in the ACTD Program 
demands that the acquisition process be tailored to the maximum extent possible. This 
best affords ACTD management the opportunity to achieve individual and ACID 
program objectives. 
3. Class I ACTDs should be exercised under cost-reimbursement type 
contracts. 
Class I ACTD systems involve software development which is R&D in nature. 
To mitigate the Government's cost, schedule and performance risks, contracting officers 
should seek to use Cost reimbursement type contracts. The exact type of contract should 
be tailored to the situation based on the program executives' degree of confidence 
concerning the estimated ACTD cost, schedule and performance levels. To incentivize 
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the contractor performance and maintain some control in the process the recommended 
contract type is a Cost-Plus Award Fee contract. 
4. Government Contracting Officers should consider the use of Section 
845, Other Transactions authority in the contracting for ACTDs. 
The flexibility provided in this method of acquisition married with the initiatives 
of the ACTD Program could be an effective means of dealing with the acquisition of 
ACTDs and follow-on production. This should not preclude the consideration of other, 
more traditional, methods when available. The level of oversight is the principal limiting 
factor in this recoIllIIlended action. However, the use of sound source selection 
procedures and validation of contractors' management systems may preclude the need for 
costly Government oversight and thus mitigate the risk associated with OTs. 
5. Government Contracting Officers should use new contracts for 
integrating software and hardware items in Class III ACTDs. 
The overriding concern for most Class III ACTDs is the integration of systems. . 
While it is efficient and proper to use pre-existing contracts in the assembly of ACIDs 
this practice should not be universally applied. This practice can impose an increased 
burden on contractors and can result in decreased control over the major factors of cost, 
schedule and performance critical to the conduct of an ACTD. 
6. Government Contracting Officers should seek to use Fixed-Price 
contracts in the production phase of the program. 
While inadequate data exists to analyze the methods employed in the transition to 
the formal acquisition and production of ACTD systems, the use of fixed price contracts 
should be sought whenever possible to mitigate, the cost risks to the Government. 
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Beginning with a high level of technology maturity required for ACTD selection and 
increasing that level through completion of the demonstration, program officials should 
have enough cost level confidence to proceed to follow on production with a contract that 
places more of the cost risk burden on to the contractor. Programs should develop, from 
the initiation of the ACTD, cost data that will allow production contracts via the formal 
acquisition process to be under fixed cost arrangements. 
7. Individual ACTD programs should designate a dedicated Transition 
Manager to each program. 
The level of effort that must be attained to successfully transition an ACID is 
more than sufficient to warrant the designation of a Transition Manager and Transition 
IPT. The exact level of effort and expertise required in the positions will vary from 
program to program. This will be based principally on the complexity of the technology 
and whether the program intends to transition to full production. The Transition Manager 
should fall under the administrative control of the Technology Manager for 
administrative purposes. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. The ACTD process was established with a goal of providing military capability to 
the warfighter in less time than formal acquisition'. With some ACTD programs 
scheduled for completion within two years, this goal is hindered by resource and budget 
constraints. The primary constraint is the inability to perform the timely programming of 
funds during the appropriate Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle. Since the 
typical POM schedule is planned two years in advance the most ambitious ACTDs can 
miss a POM cutoff for out year funding at its inception. A study of the methods used to 
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obtain and secure funding for ACTDs should be conducted to analyze the most effective 
methods for future acquisitions. 
2. The ACTD process is a relatively new acquisition reform measure. The program 
began in 1994 with eleven ACTDs initiated in 1995. Originally the duration of these 
programs was established to be two to four years. The original and subsequent year's 
programs are nearing the end of their prescribed period of duration. A principal 
advantage of ACTD implementation was perceived to be a shortened cycle time for 
acquisition and fielding of systems with military utility to the warfighter. ACrD 
Program managers are provided flexibility in their operations to achieve this advantage. 
An evaluation of ACTD programs should be conducted to assess their success or failure 
in achieving a reduction in cycle time and meeting the goal of getting capable systems to 
the warfighters. 
3. This research has indicated that there is some controversy regarding the goal of 
the ACTD program and thus the proper direction for candidate and selected programs. 
The debate centers on whether the mission is primarily meant to promote new technology 
insertion to the warfighter or to shorten the acquisition process. Also the selection 
criteria for ACTD candidates have been criticized as being vague and some selected 
programs have been considered improper. A detailed review of the criteria and ACID 
Program objectives should be conducted that will more succinctly identify the goal of the 
ACTD Program and provide recommendations for selection criteria. 
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APPENDIX A: ACTD SELECTION CRITERIA 
[DUSD(AT) Guidelines for ACTD Formulation] 
1. The timeframe for completing the evaluation of military utility is typically 2-
4 years. 
This provides ample time to design, fabricate fieldable prototypes of near-term 
capabilities and to allow warfighters to evaluate them. For less complex systems or 
systems that are available quickly (e.g. COTS) the timeline may be significantly shorter. 
Similarly, for very complex systems that require extensive integration and developmental 
testing, slightly more time may be required. In the interest of avoiding delays in the 
fielding of new technology, the timelines should be kept as short as practical. 
2. The technology should be sufficiently mature. 
Unlike Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs), which are intended to 
evolve and demonstrate new technology, ACTDs begin with mature or nearly mature 
technology and focus on the question of military utility (value to the warfighter) of a 
proposed capability. Technology maturity is important for two reasons. First, the 
nominal 2-4 year timeframe does not allow t~me for technology development activities 
during the ACTD. Second, technology development introduces schedule uncertainty, 
which is highly undesirable. ACTDs often involve force-on-force military exercises 
involving large military forces. To permit these exercises to be executed according to 
plan, the systems being employed must be available on schedule. Furthermore, they must 
be dependable and they must perform as predicted. Technical performance should not be 
a significant issue during the utility assessment phase. Therefore, new technologies 
proposed for incorporation into an ACTD should not be in the 6.1 (basic research) or 6.2 
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(applied research) budget categories. Furthermore, the technologies must have been 
successfully demonstrated at the subsystem or component level and at the required 
performance level prior to the start of the ACTD. Alternatively, they can be scheduled 
for demonstration as a separate effort in parallel with the ACTD. In this case the 
demonstration must be completed prior to the time the technology will be introduced into 
the utility asses~ment phase of the ACTD. Exceptions are permitted under any of three 
conditions: 
(a) The technology is not used in the "performance critical" path of the ACTD 
and therefore a performance shortfall would not impact the performance of the 
basic capability being evaluated. 
(b) The technology is not used in a "core system". In some cases, ACTDs 
include in portions of the evaluation phase, an advanced concept that is 
participating on a non-interference basis. Their performance does "not impact the 
evaluation of the core system. These arrangements represent low cost, piggyback 
opportunities to evaluate the advanced concepts. 
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(c) An exception has been granted by the DUSD/AT. 
3. Provides a potentially effective response to a priority military need. 
The need that is being addressed by the proposed candidate must be clearly 
supported by the intended user of the capability. During the ACTD selection process, the 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) will review and prioritize the remaining 
candidates according to military need. Candidate ACTDs should be focused on military 
needs that are expected to receive adequate priority in that forum. It is also important to 
confirm that the capability being proposed represents a reasonably cost-effective response 
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to the need. ACTDs are not required to be supported by an extensive analysis of 
alternatives or cost and operational effectiveness analyses. However, it is important to 
consider the alternative approaches and show that the proposed approach offers an 
attractive near-term capability. This capability should also be designed to allow 
evolution in response to changes in the threat or in the technologies involved. 
4. The User signs up to be intimately involved in the ACTD. 
The involvement of a User Sponsor (warfighter) is vital to the success of an 
ACTD because the assessment of military utility by the warfighter is a key element of the 
process. In most cases the User Sponsor is one of the Unified Combatant Commands, 
frequently supported by one or more of their component commands. No ACTD will be 
initiated without the commitment of a warfighting element to participate fully in the 
ACTD and perform that assessment. The warfighter must also: 
(a). Provide the operational concepts for employment of the proposed capability. 
(b). Provide oversight and support of the exercise(s) that will be used to assess 
utility. 
(c). Provide the utility assessment at the conclusion of the. ACTD. 
The user must reflect a commitment of the resources to perform these tasks in an 
Implementation Directive. 
5. A lead Service/agency has been designated. 
With few exceptions, the capability being evaluated during the ACTD will 
become the responsibility of the services or operational agencies once the ACTD has 
been completed. The lead service/agency will be responsible for preparing transition of 
the residual assets to the user organization and for all aspects of their support. Where it is 
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possible that the utility assessment will result in a decision to acquire more units, the lead 
service/agency must ensure the necessary planning for transition to formal acquisition has 
been accomplished. An ACTD will not be approved unless there is a commitment by a 
lead service/agency to accept the responsibility for preparing the transition at the end of 
the ACTD. 
6. The risks have been identified, are understood and accepted. 
Even with the use of sufficiently mature technology, there can be technical risks 
associated with engineering and integration work to be performed. The more complex 
the capability, the greater these risks tend to be. In addition, there can be programmatic 
risks (e.g. cost and schedule), as well as operational risks related to the acceptability of 
the operational concepts necessary to realize the full benefit of the proposed capability. 
These risks must be identified and accepted by the primary stakeholders in the ACTD 
prior to its initiation. 
7. Demonstrations or exercises have been identified that will provide an 
adequate basis for the utility assessment. 
The heart of an ACTD is the assessment of military utility by the warfighter. This 
activity should not be confused with the developmental testing performed in a technology 
demonstration (TD), in an ATD, or even in the risk reduction (DemNal) phase of an 
. acquisition program. It is also broader than normal operational testing. Military utility is 
defined as: (a) effectiveness in performing the mission, (b) suitability for use by the user, 
and (c) the overall impact the proposed capability has on the conflict or military 
operations. Meaningful assessments of effectiveness and suitability require realistic 
combat environments that will stress both the equipment, and its operating procedures. 
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In many cases, this requires the use of an opposing force to create realistic and stressful 
conditions that will provide an opportunity for the full value of the capability to be 
revealed. The ACTD proposed should either identify planned exercises/demonstrations 
that will meet the needs or propose new exercises/demonstrations for that purpose. The 
user is responsible for ensuring the conditions under which the evaluation is conducted 
are representative of the anticipated operational environment. Although the user is 
responsible for· making the assessment of utility, the user can normally benefit 
significantly from support by the operational test community. The operational test 
agencies (OTAs) are well experienced in decomposing top level questions of 
effectiveness and suitability into specific measures of effectiveness, performance and 
suitability. They have also offered to provide support to the User Sponsors in planning 
the utility assessments, in analyzing the results, or both. User Sponsors are strongly 
encouraged to take advantage of this capability. 
The third element of military utility, the overall impact on the conflict, highlights 
the difference between the ACTD exercises and traditional technical testing. The impact 
on the conflict is the result of not just the new technical capability, but also the gains 
which result from effective employment of that capability by the using unit, and of gains 
in other parts of the battle that result from higher performance of the using unit (e.g. 
domino effect). The overall impact is the integrated effect of all three factors. 
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8. Funding is sufficient to complete the planned assessment of utility and to 
provide technical support for the first two years of fielding of the interim 
capability. 
A budget must be developed and submitted as a part of the proposed ACTD. This 
budget must identify all costs associated with the design and development of the 
prototype system, all additional units required in the ACTD, all exercises that must be 
paid by the project, and test support costs including any modeling simulation and analysis 
needed to support the utility assessment. The budget must also include costs related to 
planning and preparations for transition into acquisition, as well as the cost to provide 
technical support for the first two years of fielding the residuals. The lead service is 
assumed to budget for all support costs beyond that point. ACTD funding is typically 
provided by the participating technology programs with supplemental funding from the 
DUSDI AT funding line as appropriate. This OSD supplemental funding is typically 
about 10% of the total cost of the ACTD and is for (1) integration of the technologies 
with existing systems for the demonstration, (2) providing multiple copies of system 
elements where that is critical to the user's evaluation of military utility, and (3) technical 
support of the residual capability, during which time the user will continue to evaluate the 
concept during routine training activities and will continue to mature the concepts of 
operation. Proposals for OSD funding should be coordinated with ODUSDI AT during 
the formulation phase. 
9. Developer is ready to prepare a plan that covers all essential aspects. 
Within 90 days following approval of an ACTD, a fully coordinated ACTD 
Management Plan must be forwarded to the DUSDI AT for final signature. The contents 
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of this plan are defined in the Guidelines for ACTD Management Plans as published in 
the Defense Acquisition Deskbook and are also available on the DUSD/AT website 
(www.acq.osd.mil/at). Coordination and approval of this plan early in the ACTD is key 
to getting all participants onto the same game plan. It is important that the ACTD 
planning effort be sufficiently detailed and support completion of the plan within 90 days. 
[Ref. 33: pp. 2-4] 
• 
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APPENDIX B: ACTD POINTS OF CONTACT / SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
NOTE: Demonstration Managers have recently been designated as "Technology 
Managers" by the DUSD(AT). These points of contact remain designated . 
as Demonstration Managers by their programs. 
Advanced Joint Planning (Class I): 
Advanced Technology (AT) Staff: CAPT Tom Radich, USN, (703) 697-6446 
Dr. Robert McWilliams, Demonstration Manager, (703) 526-6623 
LTC Paul Gillis, USMC, AJP Operational Manager, (804) 322-7605 
LTC Paul Neal, USA, AJMRR Operational Manager, (703) 693-8192 
Kinetic Energy Boost-Phase Intercept (BPI) (CLASS II): 
AT Staff: Mr. Tom Perdue, (703) 695-8045 
Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) (CLASS III): 
AT Staff: Dr. Charles Perkins, (703) 697-3568 
High Altitude Endurance (HAE) UA V (CLASS II): 
AT Staff: Lt Col Marty Meyer, (703) 614-8436 
Mr. Chuck Heber, Demonstration Manager, (703) 524-5199 
Lt Col John Wellman, Operational Manager, USACOM/J-RC/J-33,(757) 322-7613 
Joint Countermine (JCM) (CLASS III): 
AT Staff: CAPT Tom Radich, USN, (703) 695-5036 
Col Joe Singleton, USMC, Demonstration Manager, (703) 696-1299 
CDR Peter Morford, USN, Operational Manager, (757) 322-5025 
Low Life Cycle Cost, Medium Lift Helicopter (LLCCMLH) (CLASS II): 
AT Staff: CAPT Tom Radich, USN, (703) 697-6416 
Medium Altitude Endurance (MAE) UA V "Predator" (CLASS II): 
AT Staff: Lt Col Marty Meyer, USAF, (703) 614-8436 
Precision/Rapid Counter-Multiple Rocket Launcher (PRC-MRL) (CLASS III): 
AT Staff: Dr. Charles Perkins, (703) 697-3568 
CPT Wil Riggins, USA, Demonstration Manager, JSPD, (703) 704-1527 
LTC M. Warner, USA, Operational Manager, USF Korea, DSN 723-7363 
Precision Signals Intelligence Targeting Systems (PSTS) (CLASS I): 
AT Staff: Dr. Charles Perkins, (703) 697-3568 
CDR Dennis Sorensen, USN, Demonstration Manager, ONR Code 35, (703) 696-5775 
LTC Ken Manfra, USA, Operational Manager, CINCPAC STA, (808) 477-0795 
Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI) (CLASS III): 
AT Staff: Dr. Charles Perkins, (703) 697-3568 
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Ms. Emily H. Vandiver, Demonstration Manager, MICOM, (256) 876-4857 
COL Timothy Bosse, USA, Operational Manager, DBBL, (706) 545-2310 
Synthetic Theater of War (STOW) (CLASS I): 
AT Staff: Dr. Judith Daly,(703) 614-8436 (V) 
Mr. Rae Dehncke, Demonstration Manager, AITS JPO, (703) 284-8892 
Lt Col Robert Strini, USAF, Operational Manager, USACOM J-73, (757) 686-7525 
Air BaselPort Biological Detection (Class III): 
AT Staff: Dr. Judith Daly (703) 614-8436 
Mr. Brian David, Demonstration Manager, Bio Defense JPO, (703) 681-9602 
LTC Mike Urban, USA Operational Manager, USCENTCOM, (813) 828-6229 
Battlefield Awareness and Data Dissemination (BADD) (Class I): 
AT Staff: Mr. Thomas Perdue (703) 695-8045 
Mr. Bob Beaton Demonstration Manager DARPA (703) 696-1122 
Lt Col James Dorman Operational Manager USACOM J-36 (757) 322-5880 
Combat Identification (CID) (Class III): 
AT Staff COL John Fricas (703) 614-0192 
Dr. Gerardo J. Melendez Demonstration Manager SF AE IEWS (732) 427-5970 
LTC John E. Arthur, USA Operational Manager USACOM (757) 836-7857 
Combat Vehicle Survivability (CVS) (CLASS I): 
AT Staff: COL John Fricas (703) 614-0192 
Dr. Mark McHenry Demonstration Manager DARPA (703) 696-7495 
COL Kalb, USA Operational Manager USA Armor Center (502) 624-5050 
Counterproliferation I (CPI) (CLASS III): 
AT Staff: Service/Agency User Sponsor Dr. Judith Daly DSN 224-8436 
Mr. Vayl Oxford Demonstration Manager DSW AlPMC (703) 325-4899 
Ms. Rhonda Cervantes-Palmer, Business Manager, DSN 211-1300 
Counter Sniper (CS) (CLASS II): 
AT Staff: Dr. Charles Perkins, (703) 697-3568 
Joint Logistics (JL) (Class I): 
AT Staff: Mr. Dan Winegrad (703) 693-0462 
LTC Joseph McVeigh Demonstration Manager DARPA (703) 526-6612 
LTC Al Navarra Operational Manager USACOM, J4 (757) 836-5186 
Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD) (Class II): 
Lt Col Marty Meyer, USAF (703) 614-8436 meyermg@acq.osd.mil 
Lt Col Walter R. Price, USAF Demonstration Manager DARPA (703) 696-7500 
Maj Jim Avrit, USAF Operational Manager HQ AC,CIDRl (757) 764-6219 
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Navigation Warfare (NA VW AR) (CLASS II): 
AT Staff: Dr. Charles Perkins (703) 697-3568 
SQNLDR Martin Ball Demonstration Manager SMC/CZU (310) 363-6524 
Maj Kirk Little, USAF Operational Manager USACOMlJ362D (757) 836-535115451 
Semi-Automated Imagery Intelligence Processing (SAIIP) (CLASS I): 
AT Staff Dr. Judith Daly (703) 614-8436 
Mr. Stephen Welby, Demonstration Manager DARPAIISO (703) 696-2374 
Ms. Patricia Moore Operational Manager USACOM J22 (757) 836-5018 
Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) (CLASS I):: 
AT Staff: Mr. Tom Perdue (703) 695-8045 
Mr. Richard Bradshaw Demonstration Manager SMDC(205) 955-3643 
LTC Tom Flynn, USA Operational Manager USAADASCH (915) 568-7611 
Chemical Add-On (CLASS III): 
AT Staff: Dr. Judith Daly (703) 614-8436 (V) 
Mr. Brian David Demonstration Manager JPOBD (703) 681-9602 
LTC Mike Urban, USA Operational Manager USCENTCOM (813) 828-6229 (V) 
Counterprolifer'ation II (CPII) (CLASS III): 
AT Staff: Dr. Judith Daly, (703) 614-8436, DSN 224-8436 
Mr. Vayl Oxford, Demonstration Manager, DSWA, (703) 325-4899 DSN 221 
Col Fred Koch, USAF Operational Manager USEUCOM J-5 DSN 430-8320 
Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB) (CLASS III): 
AT Staff: Dr. Judith Daly, (703) 614-8436 
Mr. Mike Kretzer, Demonstration Manager, AFIWCIISC, (210) 977-2567 
LCDR Keith Menz, USN Operational Manager, USCENTCOM, (813) 828-5162 
Information Operations Planning Tool (IOPT) (CLASS I): 
. AT Staff: Dr. Charles Perkins, (703) 697-3568 
Ms. Marsha Hart, Demonstration Manager, DIAlCL3, (703) 907-0636 
MAJ Marty Sheil, USA Operational Manager, USACOM, (757) 836-0282 
Joint Advanced Heaalth and Usage Monitoring System (JAHUMS) (CLASS 11): 
AT Staff: Mr. Dan Winegrad, (703) 693-0462 
Dr. David Haas, Demonstration Manager, NSWC/CD, (301) 227-1397 
LCDR Dave Spracklen, USN Operational Manager, NAVAIRSYSCOM, (301) 757-5335 
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) (Class III): 
AT Staff: COL John Fricas, USA, (703) 614-0192 (v) 
Ms. Carol Fitzgerald, Demonstration Manager, USA, SSC, (703) 704-1427 
COL Tim Bosse, USA Operational Manager, DBBL, (706) 545-2310 
Col James Lasswell, USMC Operational Manager, MCWL, (703) 784-5169 
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Rapid Terrain Visualization (RTV) (CLASS II): 
AT Staff: COL John Fricas, USA, (703) 614-0192 
Mr. Chris Moscoso, Demonstration Manager, JPSD PO, (703) 704-1966 
COL Donald Riley, USA Operational Manager, Dep Dir., MSBL (573) 563-7959 
Chemical Add-On (CLASS I): 
AT Staff: Dr. Judith Daly, (703) 614-8436 (V) 
Mr. Brian David, Demonstration Manager, JPOBD, (703) 681-9602 
LTC Mike Urban, USA Operational Manager, USCENTCOM, (813) 828-6229 (V) 
Adaptive Course of Action (ACOA) (CLASS I): 
AT Staff: Mr. Dan Winegrad, (703) 693-0462 
Mr. Don Eddington, Demonstration Manager, DARPAIDISA JPO, (703) 284-8727/8890 
Mr. Jens A. Jensen, Operat.ional Manager, USPACOM, (808) 477-4650 
C41 for Coalition Warfare (C4I) (Class I): 
AT Staff: Dr. Judith Daly, 703-614-8436 
Maj Graham Le Fevre, Demonstration Manager, SAIS-PAA-S, DISC4 703-695-4555 
LTC Chip Phillips, Operational Manager, EUCOM J3 DSN 314-430-4164 
Mr. Paul Ulrich, Program Mana,ger, 732-532-4676 
Information Assurance: Automated Intrusion Detection Environment (IA:AIDE) 
(CLASS I): 
AT Staff: Dr. Charles Perkins, (703) 697-3568 
Mr. Jack Eller, Demonstration Manager, DISAlD25, (703) 681-7929 
Mr. David Ellis, Operational Manager, USSTRATCOM, Code J671, (402) 294-5864 
Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System (JBREWS) (CLASS III): 
AT Staff: Dr. Judith Daly, (703) 614-8436 (V) 
Mr. Brian David, Demonstration Manager, JPOBD, (703) 681-9602 
LTC Robert Neumann, Operational Manager, USEUCOM, 011-49-711-680-8262 
Joint Continuous Strike Environment (JCSE) (CLASS I): 
AT Staff: Dr. Judith Daly, (703) 614-8436 
Ms. Rosanne Hynes, Demonstration Manager, OSD/CISA, (703) 607-0410 
LCDR Michael T. Steed, USN Operational Manager, USEUCOM, ECJ-35 
Joint Modular Light System (JMLS) (CLASS II): 
AT Staff: Mr. Dan Winegrad, 703-693-0462 
Mr. Gregory Walker, Demonstration Manager, NA VF ACENGCOM, 703-325-8535 
CnR Bill Beary, USN Operational Manager, (757) 464-7364 
Line-of-Sight Anti-Tank (LOSAT) (CLASS II): 
AT Staff: Mr. Tom Perdue, 703-695-8045 
Mr. Rich Paladino, Demonstration Manager, CCA WS PMO, 205-842-0851 
. COL Timothy G. Bosse, USA, Operational Manager, DBBL, 706-545-2310 
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Link-16 (CLASS I): ' 
AT Staff: LtCol Marty Meyer, USAF, (703) 614-8436 (V) 
Mr. Joel Simkol, Demonstration Manager, PEO-SCS, (619) 524-7782 (V) 
CDR Hugh Cook, USN Operational Manager, USACOM, (732) 836-5869 (V) 
Migration Defense Intelligence Threat Data System (MDITDS) (CLASS I): 
AT Staff: Dr. Judith Daly, (703) 614-8436 
Mr. Danny Proko, Demonstration Manager, DIA, (202) 231-8218 
Lt Col Marty Meyer, USAF, (703) 614-8436 
Precision Targeting Identification (PTI) (CLASS II): 
Mr. C.N. Shen, Demonstration Manager, NAWC-AD, (301)-342-0093 
CDR B. Gray, USN, (703) 614-2979 NAVAIR 
Mr. T. McGee, Operational Manager, JIATFE/SCIAD, (305) 293-5669 
Space-Based Space Surveillance Operations (SBSSO) (CLASS I): 
AT Staff: Dr. Charles Perkins, (703) 697-3568 
Maj Frank Williams, USAF Demonstration Manager, AFSTCIDRF, (719) 554-6163 
Capt Oscar Vaughn, USAF, Operational Manager, 21st OSS, (719) 556-6850 
Theater Precision Strike Operations (TPSO) (CLASS I): 
AT Staff: Dr. Charles Perkins, (703) 697-3568 
LTC Rob Pope, USA, Demonstration Manager, JPSDPO, (703) 704-1962 
LTC John Dunham, USA Operational Manager, DSABL, (405) 442-3139 
Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) (CLASS II): 
Mr. Will Williams, RMWS PM, (813) 828-9367 
Maj. Brad Butz, USAF, (703) 696-6891 
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APPENDIX C: SURVEY RESULTS - ACTD CONTRACT TYPE SURVEY 
(Only input from responding programs are included) 
Type of Contract Vehicle Class I Class II Class III 
Modification to pre-existing contract 2 
Omnibus Contract (Pre-existing) 1 
Cost-Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) 4 4 
Cost-Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) 2 
Cost-Plus Award Fee (CPAF) 1 
Other Transactions (OT) 1 
In-House / Government provided . 1 
Indefmite Delivery/ Indefinite Quantity 1 
Lease at Firm Fixed Price 1 
Commercial Off-The~Shelf (COTS) 3 
Fixed Price - Incentive (FPI) 1 
Firm Fixed Price 
Cost Share 1 
Follow-on Options Included 3 
Note: Some programs used multiple methods. 
(Only primary or significant secondary methods were recorded.) 
Source: Survey results from researcher conducted interviews. 
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